
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX



DOCKET NO. 76-1140

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

V.

DAVID N. BUBAR, ET AL.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT



JOINT APPENDIX TO BRIEF

DADE WILDER OF FOLIA

PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

vs.

CHARLES D. MOELLER, et al.,

Defendants.

New Haven, Connecticut January 15, 1976

Before:

Hon. JON O. NEWMAN, U.S.D.J.

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(In the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, there's a note from the jury concerning testimony. It reads as follows: "Request to have the testimony of guard Windisch and John Shaw's testimony beginning with the meeting at Howard Johnson's and through to the trip to New York City on March 2nd."

Now, my understanding as to what's available is that almost all of the testimony of Windisch has been transcribed: that is, all of his direct and two of the cross examinations, and I have asked --

MR. CLIFFORD: Craig's not here.

THE COURT: Oh, he's not here?

MR. CLIFFORD: I suppose this concerns him. I'll look.

THE COURT: I'll start again, because apparently Mr. Craig was not present when I started.

The note reads: "Request to have the testimony of guard Windisch and John Shaw's testimony beginning with the meeting at Howard Johnson's and through to the trip to New York City on March 2nd."

Now, as far as what's available, there has been transcribed the testimony of Windisch, which includes his direct examination and the cross examination by Mr. Clifford and Mr. Golub. There is some additional cross examination, and I have asked the court reporter to locate those portions, so one possibility would be to give them the transcript and then to

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read to them the additional cross, it's fairly brief, that has not been transcribed, so that way, we would respond to their first request.

The second request I think still encounters the same problem we had yesterday. Testimony of Shaw from the Howard Johnson's meeting through to the New York City trip is very extensive, particularly when it includes cross, so I'm reluctant to deal with that request for the same reasons I told them yesterday.

Are there any other suggestions?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, I have. My suggestion is that the Court should at this moment forget your reluctance to deal with that issue, for that's the crux of this case, the testimony of John W. Shaw. I made my position yesterday with reference to same and made the statement of a word "consternment", which means in face of the con --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. ZALOWITZ: -- consternation of the Judge, but, however, your Honor, without -- without --

THE COURT: Mr. --

MR. ZALOWITZ: Please, may I continue, sir? I don't want to be curtailed. Especially at such a crucial moment.

THE COURT: Begin by telling me what you want.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I want that full testimony of John W. Shaw made available, whether it creates a problem for the Court

or no.

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THE COURT: All right. I understand your position. Any other suggestion?

MR. ZALOWITZ: And otherwise -- forgive me, sorry -otherwise, I'm asserting it's a deprivation of due process of law with regards to the rightsof Reverend David Bubar in connection with the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Ninth Amendment of the Constitution and all applications of the law and the decisions there.

THE COURT: All right. First, with respect to the request concerning the Windisch testimony --

MR. CRAIG: We have no objection, your Honor.

MR. CLIFFORD: I have no objection.

THE COURT: The suggestion is to give them the transcript and read them those portions of his testimony that have not been transcribed?

MR. CLIFFORD: My only concern is do we know that -whose cross examination that is?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DORSEY: I have got a note that Mr. Craig and Clifford, Mr. Koskoff and Mr. Golub cross examined.

THE COURT: There's a cross by Meehan. Mr. Golub, Mr. Meehan, Mr. Clifford, Mr. Koskoff, Mr. Curtis and then Mr. Golub and Mr. Meehan.

MR. DORSEY: With respect to the request of Shaw's

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testimony, is your Honor concerned about the fact that not all of it is now available? The reason I've asked is I talked to Mr. Russell and Mr. Gale --

MR. ZALOWITZ: I'm sorry. I don't hear you sir, forgive me.

MR. DORSEY: I understand that about 85 percent of the Shaw testimony has already been transcribed.

from yesterday that the parts that aren't are still fairly extensive. Now, maybe they're not. I was told -- of course, I don't know what's remaining consists of, I don't know whether it's out of the jury's hearing or not. It would seem to me that what's been requested would have been the crucial parts from the point of view of whatever the defendnats requested and, therefore, some of the colloquies and -- out of the hearing of jury matters very well may not have been transcribed.

I was going to suggest that the transcription might be completed, and then we'd be in a better position to deal with whatever additional requests might be forthcoming from them.

I'm frank to say that I'm really not looking to
perpetuate Mr. Zalowitz's discussions with the Court, but I
thought that that might solve some of the problems if all
was actually available. Mr. Russell said he would look into the
question of how much would be required to complete it.

MR. KOSKOFF: I think it's a monumental problem, as

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your Honor indicated, to read all of Shaw's testimony, whether it's presently transcribed or not, and I think if you read a part of it, when you get to the cross examination, you can't limit the cross examination to that part, because it goes to question of credibility, it goes to a lot — to me, it's a can of worms. The whole thing. Unless you read it all, you know, and read it all is going to take an awfully long time.

THE COURT: One other suggestion, which I thought was

Mr. Dorsey's point, was that we transcribe the balance, which

might be completed sometime tomorrow --

MR. KOSKOFF: I think one of the problems with that is that you never know -- you know, the tendency would be to pick something out of context, if you do that, someone's going to look for something that someone said, you know, without the balance that's obtained from a whole reading. You know, if you were going to give them the trans -- I don't object to Windisch actually, as far as Windisch -- when it comes to Shaw, I think you are going to have to read the transcript or --

THE COURT: You'd be opposed to giving them transcript even if it was available?

MR. KOSKOFF: Absolutely. Absolutely.

MR. SAGARIN: I concur with that. I think putting that transcript in the hands of the jury is putting John Shaw in the jury room. They don't have the benefit of the rest of the witnesses in the case. I don't have any interest, really, in

Windisch's testimony, so I don't take a position on it, but I strongly object to it.

THE COURT: Well, let's deal with what we can deal with now. We don't have his whole testimony now, so we can't deal with the whole transcript now.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Your conor, I concur with the comments of Mr. Koskoff and Mr. Sagarin, and I reiterate my position that the whole testimony of Shaw and all the cross examination must be made available, all at one time, and not piecemeal.

Otherwise, it's highly prejudicial.

THE COURT: There's been no suggestion to make it available to them piecemeal.

(Jury entered courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, I have your note which reads as follows: "Request to have the testimony of guard Windisch and John Shaw's testimony beginning with the meeting at Howard Johnson's and through to the trip to New York City on March 2nd."

Now, as far as the Windisch testimony, there has been transcribed most of it, and the court reporter has located his notes on some of the cross examination that was not transcribed, so the way we're going to handle that is to hand you the transcribed cript of Windisch's testimony, and in just a few minutes read to you those portions of cross examination that were not transcribed, so altogether you'll have it complete. Just obviously bear in mind

that what will be read to you is the cross that in sequence came after what you will have available for your inspection.

Now, with respect to the request concerning John Shaw's testimony, I appreciate that you endeavored to describe a — one sequence of his testimony. The difficult is that, as I indicated yesterday, the testimony was given over five days, and even the sequence that you described was the subject of extensive direct examination, extensive cross examination, redirect and recross, all of which in various stages touched on portions of the sequence that you've identified, so that to comply with that request at all, would mean to read to you virtually five days of testimony, and for the reasons I indicated yesterday, I'm not going to do that. It may be, as I indicated yesterday, we might be able to respond to a more particularized inquiry, but I do not think it would be appropriate to keep you in the jury box for the really extended time it would take to read to you all of the testimony that is responsive to the second request.

All right. Then, I'll ask the reporter to take his notes concerning the Windisch cross and read those portions that are not included in the transcript.

(Portions of the testimony of Fred Windisch read to the jury.)

THE COURT: The jury may go out. I'll give you the transcript.

(Jury left courtroom.)

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THE COURT: All right, gentlemen, I just mention to counsel with respect to the transcripts that we discussed last evening of the three guards which were turned over, I noticed in looking at those before the jury got them that there were a few portions of matters that were outside the jury's presence, either with the jury out of the room or bench conferences, and I deleted those references, so that the jury only got what was said in front of the jury.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Your Honor, may I just ask one question?

By the Court's statement to the jury, is it the Court's statement

that the Court has refused to honor the request with reference to

the entire transcript as requested by the jury?

From my observation and what I heard, and I believe my hearing was well, and if I'm incorrect, I shall apologize, was that the Court said he would not furnish that transcript. I say that's a violation of due process of law with reference to Reverend David Bubar for the reasons I've enumerated previously.

THE COURT: Well, you are asking as to what happened yesterday?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Today, as well, sir.

THE COURT: Well, your question was: did I refuse their request --

MR. ZALOWITZ: From the statement you made, yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- for the full testimony?

MR. ZALOWITZ: For what they requested, sir, today.

SANDERS, GALE & RUSSELL Certified Stenotype Reporters THE COURT: Well, now you are asking a different question.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I'm asking both questions, yesterday

and today, sir.

THE COURT: All right. I think what I said could not possibly be misunderstood, but so that you'll understand, they asked yesterday to have read the entire testimony of Shaw, and I rejected that request.

They asked today for a portion, namely: the part, as they described it, from the Howard Johnson's meeting to the drive to New York City. Today I rejected reading them portions

MR. ZALOWITZ: Or furnishing that portion totally to them from what has taken place in this courtroom, sir? Is that the ruling?

THE COURT: Are you going to let me finish?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Of course. I apole,123.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I'm honored to be here, sir.

for the moment; no transcript of John Shaw is being furnished, primarily for the reason that a complete transcript does not exist. There has been objection expressed to a part of the transcript being furnished to them, and there has also been objection expressed to a complete transcript being furnished, but since it doesn't exist at the moment, I'm making no decision about full transcript. They have asked to have read the full

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141 CHURCH STREET NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT testimony and a part of it, and I have ruled that both the full testimony and the part that they've requested is so extensive that as an exercise of discretion, I think it would be an undue intervention into their deliberation to put them in the jury box and read to them five days' worth of testimony.

That's the ruling. I trust you understand it?

MR. ZALOWITZ: I understand it totally, sir, and
I object to your ruling.

MR. CURTIS: Can we have a lunch hour?

THE COURT: Yes, I was going to say: all right,

counsel are excused until two o'clock, and thereafter, please

observe the five-minute rule, as I explained it yesterday, and

if you are absent from the building, leave word with the

marshals where you are.

(Recess taken for lunch.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

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(In the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: The jury advised the bailiff they want to recess for the day, and so I am just bringing them back to instruct them.

(Jury entered courtroom at 4:50 p.m.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I understand you have decided to suspend for the day and resume tomorrow morning, and as I indicated yesterday, that's a perfectly acceptable schedule.

I simply want to remind you again as forcefully as I can that during these breaks in your deliberations, you have got to consider yourselves as if you were physically sequestered in fairness to all the parties in the case, and in fairness to your fellow jurors. You must not permit any outside influence or any discussion with anybody but your fellow jurors to have any bearing on your consideration of the issues thathave been entrusted to you.

So bearing that in mind, and I am sure you will adhere to it strictly, jury is excused, and you can resume ten o'clock tomorrow. Again, chack in with the Clerk and go to the jury room. I imagine it will be that same room used today. Was that reasonably satisfactory? I take it it's an improvement over yesterday's room.

All right. We will plan to use that room again. Bear

in mind that you should not begin the deliberations until all twelve are assembled.

All right. Jury is excused until ten o'clock.

(Jury excused.)

THE COURT: I will ask the marshals that people remain in the courtroom a few minutes until the jurors have left the building. Since they have their coats, that will be very quickly.

All right.

(Court adjourned at 5:00 p.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

vs.

Criminal N-75-59

CHARLES D. MOELLER, et al.,

Defendants.

New Haven, Connecticut January 16, 1976

Before:

Hon. JON O. NEWMAN, U.S.D.J.

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(In the absence of the jury, at 11:35 a.m.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, there is a note from the jury with three items, which I will read to you.

The first says: "Request that we reivew the rules of law with respect to this case. It seems that our interpretations differ and we would like to have this matter cleared."

Second part reads: "We request John Shaw's testimony regarding the activity in Plant 4 during the night of March?.

Also, the testimony referring to the trip to New York during the early morning hours of March 2."

And the third part has to do with scheduling. It says:
"A juror has requested to adjourn at 4:00. He has an appointment
at 4:30 p.m."

part, I am simply going to have to tell them that they will have to be more specific. I may try to simply review the categories of the instruction that might help them in telling me what their problem is, in other words, I might indicate to them that the instructions cover several different areas of law, they cover the elements of the offense, they cover reasonable doubt and burden of proof and things of that wort, they cover certain considerations about accomplice testimony, eyewitness testimony, hearsay testimony, things of that sort, so that I would hope by that to evoke some more precise response. I just can't believe they want me to read to them a two-hour charge.

Now, the testimony problem is not much different than it was yesterday. They still are asking for a good bit of testimony, although they are obviously trying to narrow it. The mechanical problem is this: we don't have all of the Shaw cross examination transcribed. It may be, particularly since their last request makes it pretty clear that they have no expectation of concluding their deliberations today, that we could have the entire Shaw testimony transcribed by Monday. If we had it available, it shouldn't be too difficult to then see how much of that testimony is responsive to their request, then make the determination whether to read to them those portions of the fully transcribed testimony that are responsive to their request.

I suspect that to try to do that without transcript, bearing in mind there are nine lawyers, is going to be a virtually impossible task, whereas, if you have the transcript and can simply indicate what pages or portions thereof you think are responsive to those requests, it will be very easy to just decide yes or no, but if we do it with the court reporter reading to us and have a nine-way colloquy of what does respond to their request and what doesn't, I don't see how it will work.

Yes, Mr. Zalowitz?

MR. ZALOWITZ: For the record, your Honor, whether it takes ten minutes or take two hours, obviously, this jury is not clear as to the rules of law that have been enunciated by this Court. To endeavor just to give them highlights or to give

them captions, I feel is insignificant and is a violation of due process of law so far as Reverend Bubar is concerned --

THE COURT: You didn't understand a word I said.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I understood thoroughly. I may be in difference with you, but I understood.

THE COURT: I am not going to give them captions, I am going to suggest to them what the different areas of the charge are so that they can then tell me what they want. That's quite different.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I say they shall not be put into that particular box, because that box is the box of which I am urging and have for the last two days, sir. That box is actually putting the jury in the position of being supplicant to the Court in their determination. I made the statement.

THE COURT: Fine. You have made a statement.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Secondly -- I have not concluded, please
-- secondly, sir, I am also saying with reference to the testimony
-- now the Court has said in my presentation in the last several
days, "Mr. Zalowitz, you said it three times." I am saying
now for the fourth time, sir.

THE COURT: Do you think it's necessary to do that, sir?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir, I am so doing it. With understanding of the Court. Your Honor, to emasculate any testimony
that they requested initially, I am saying, I say with great
respect, is improper. I am saying, also, sir --

THE COURT: That's the fourth time. I am not going to get it a fifth time.

MR. ZALOWITE: I am just clarifying in propriety -THE COURT: It doesn't have to be clarified. It's
an impropriety because it's been made repetitiously, and I
don't understand it, and I don't need it again.

MR. ZALOWITZ: The Court is very sagacious and understands the full significance of my statements and what I have said previously, I am enumerating right now as if I said it completely again.

THE COURT: Four times makes it clear to me, believe it or not.

Any other suggestion that counsel have as to any of their requests?

MR. DORSEY: I take it, your Honor, that insofar as the request of testimony is concerned, that you have determined that you're not going to inquire of them as to exactly what it is they want? That is, whether they simply want particular portions of it.

I would point out that -- thatif they, for example, refer to some time period, that could be very easily covered by a particular portion of the direct, and the question is whether you are going to inquire of them as to whether they want not only the direct, but the cross, and whether or not -- assuming that you get one answer or another -- whether you're going to, in effect,

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go through all of the cross to cull out every bit of that?

It's obviously not in the same flow as the direct was, to be sure that if they do want both the direct and cross, that every bit of everyone's cross that pertains to the area they have inquired goes to them. I am not sure —

and cross, so long as their request is for testimony. If they ever come back and say, "What we want is Mr. Koskoff's cross or Mr. Dorsey's direct or Mr. Bowman's cross," then I will have to deal with that request, but so long as their request is for testimony, I am not going to pick and choose among lawyers questioning.

MR. DORSEY: Would it not seem simpler if their request is actually something which your Honor doesn't have to determine, but they can determine themselves? Can that not be defined by a question of them as to what it is exactly that they do want? I am not suggesting that they do necessarily only want one portion, one aspect of it, but on the other hand, if we find that out, that could be considerably simplified, because, as I understand it, some portions of the testimony actually have already been transcribed.

THE COURT: Well, I have indicated to them that it would be helpful if they could make their inquiry a little more focused, and this represents the latest version of their effort to do that. It doesn't distinguish between direct and cross, and so I don't

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plan to make that distinction.

MR. DORSEY: By asking them the question, it doesn't amount to a distinction drawn by your Honor, but allows them to define more specifically what it is that they want if they can define it more specifically.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. DORSEY: I would request that your Honor do that.

THE COURT: Defense counsel would think it draws their attention in a way that they would prefer it not be drawn.

MR. DORSEY: I am sure that's true, but the fact still remains if a jury does specifically have a request, they have the right to make that request.

THE COURT: That's right, but their request is for testimony. They didn't say direct testimony.

MR. DORSEY: But it hasn't been brought to their attention that they could make a more specific request if they wished to do so.

THE COURT: I did mention yesterday that the testimony involved direct, cross, redirect and -- I may have said redirect. If I did, that was in error. There was extensive recross.

MR. DORSEY: I would ask that your Honor inquire of them as to whether it can be more specifically defined as to what they want in that regard.

MR. CRAIG: Could I inquire of Mr. Gale to what extent the burden would be to complete the transcript?

reporter, and one of our problems is we are not entirely sure for the reason that without reviewing the notes, we can't tell how much of the remaining notes involves bench conference and matters outside the presence of the jury. Our estimate is there is a fair chance of getting it completed Monday, and, in any event, there is a substantial amount of it done now, so that counsel could well spend today and perhaps part of tomorrow indicating what of the transcribed pages they think is responsive to this request. That task I don't think it all that difficult because the time sequence they have indicated is reasonably identifiable.

MR. CRAIG: Could I ask whether that request really does significantly focus over and above the request prior to that? It seems to me this request is almost identical to the request that you rejected yesterday with respect to Shaw's activities in the plant and the trip to New York.

THE COURT: You see, this says the night. That's quite a limitation.

MR. CRAIG: Four or five hours.

THE COURT: Not only four or five hours of time, but probably two days of testimony.

MR. KOSKOFT: It would be your intention to just exclude everything else, give them that, and whatever all the lawyers think are part of that that they propose, that they would get?

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Or is it your intention to give them the whole transcript? I am not quite sure --

assumption that what we think is responsive is not too extensive,
In other words, I don't want to stop their deliberations and read
to them for three days, much less five -- but if we transcribe
it all and determine that the part of the transcribed testimony
that is responsive to their request can be read in a reasonable
period of time, then we would read that part to them.

MR. KOSKOFF: Don't you almost have to read all of the cross, even if it doesn't relate to that subject, that particular subject? Because what you're dealing with is credibility. The other day I thought it was a monstrous job, unless you read all the testimony or none. Because you still have the problem, don't you --

portion of testimony. Obviously, that excludes other parts of the testimony that may have some bearing on the credibility of the testimony they have requested, but there is really nowhere to draw the line. By that token, we would read to them the whole trial, because so many other witnesses bore on the credibility by giving different accounts. They bore on the credibility of what Shaw said as to the night, so I just think it simpossible to respond to a request by giving them everything that bears on credibility short of reading them the entire trial.

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There may be some aspects that not only bear on credibility, but bear on the night. In other words, in the cross a lawyer said to Mr. Shaw, "Didn't you say to the FBI that you didn't see a man there that night?", well, that certainly is cross that bears on the testimony they have requested, so to that extent, they get the attack on credibility.

As I say, I don't know how much would be responsive. I think it might be manageable, and I think there is a sufficient likelihood that it's worth having the reporter, as promptly as he can, finish the transcript so that we can make our determination and, indeed, we have several volumes now to work with.

My own review of my notes on cross indicate that much of the cross is not responsive to this request.

Any other observations?

MR. CLIFFORD: I don't like it, but I can't say why.

(Jury entered courtroom at 12:00 noon.)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, your note this morning has three items, and dealing with the third one first, which simply says: "A juror has requested to adjourn at 4:00 p.m. He has an appointment at 4:30 p.m.," we will adopt that schedule for today. I suspect there will be some snow, so it may be just as well.

Your second request, let me read it to you, says:
"We request John Shaw's testimony regarding the activity in
Plant 4 during the night of March 1. Also, the testimony

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referring to the trip to New York during the early morning hours of March 2."

At the moment, I am just unable to tell you whether we will be mechanically able to respond to that request or not.

It's something we are going to explore. We will have to review a lot of reporter's notes, of some things transcribed, and just see how much is involved, and then I will have to make some determination, and, frankly, what it comes down to is this: if the testimony responsive to your request involves reading to you material that would take an extended period of time to read to you, I am not so sure I am going to do that, but that's something we will explore, and I just don't think we will be able to know the answer to that today, but I assume from your last request that you don't expect to conclude your deliberations today, and I just — and will report further to you on the subject of whether we will be able to answer your request concerning Shaw's testimony on Monday.

Your first request says: "Request that we review the rules of law with respect to this case. It seems that our interpretations differ, and we would like to have this matter cleared."

Well, now, on that one, I am going to ask you to give me a little further guidance. It may be that you're asking for the entire charge to be read, or at least that portion of it that dealt with the law rather than a summary of the evidence.

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I point out to you that even the discussion of the law probably took about an hour and a half, but if your feeling is that you need the entire discussion of the law reread to you, I would want to know that.

It may be that there are certain portions as to which you want to hear a repeat of the instruction. For example, when you say, "We would like to have this matter cleared," naturally, it raises in my mind the question of whether there is a particular problem.

Let me indicate the different areas the charge covered, which might assist you, and then tell me what you have in mind.

There were instructions on the standards involved on presumption of innocence, burden of proof, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, things of that sort. There were instructions on the elements of the four offenses.

I should break that down. There was at one point simply a listing of each element of each offense, and then there was some discussion as to further explanation of the elements of the offenses.

of some considerations that must be borne in mind in assessing certain testimony. For example, considerations to be borne in mind in assessing wind in assessing eyewitness testimony, in assessing the testimony of an accomplice, in considering telephone toll records, things

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of that sort.

Now, before I decide what to do with your first request concerning the rules of law, I would rather hear from you once again in a note before I make any decision, frankly, so that, for example, you could tell me, "We want the entire charge from word one to the last word," or you could say, "We are not interested in your summary of the evidence, we are interested in whatever you said about the rules of law, leaving off the summary of the evidence," or you might say, "We are interested in what you said about certain aspects of the law," either the elements or the standards of proof, what does reasonable doubt mean, or what are the considerations about evewitness testimony, or something of the sort, so I think you can give me a little more guidance as to whether you want all or some parts of the charge, because the total charge, I think, took about two and a half hours.

Now, it may be that's what you want, but I am reluctant to sit you here and read to you for two and a half hours and then find out: no, you only wanted ten minute's worth on one very precise topic, but weren't exactly sure how to request it, so that's why I rather give you that opportunity rafore I hold you as a captive audience in a jury box for two and a half hours. So I will ask you, then, to resume your deliberations, and at such time as you care to send me a further note concerning a reinstruction on the law, and I will just have to defer the issue

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of reading you testimony until I can explore how much time will be involved in doing that.

Now, if it occurs to you to further refine your inquiry as to testimony, of course, you can do so, I am not suggesting you need to, but if you have a more specific inquiry as to testimony, you can let me know that, but I will take the request that's now before me and explore with the court reporter how and whether we are able to comply with that.

All right. Jury excused.

(Jury excused at 12:05 p.m.)

THE COURT: There were different junctures during the trial when one or more defendants asked to be excused, and in almost all instances, the request was made before the defendant left, and I don't think I ever turned one down. I may have delayed one a bit, but I think generally that was always honored.

There were a few instances where somebody said he left, and we will put it on the record when he gets back, and generally that occurred, but I think not always, and I know there was a recent time when a defendant was not here, but his lawyer assured me he heard from the client, and the client understood the trial would go ahead, and he had no objection.

Rather than recount every single one, I really think in view of the representations I have had, that the defendant ought to put on the record, so there will be no ambiguity about it, if it's the case, which is what I have been told, that, in

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fact, they do not object to the continuation of the trial up to this point. I am not talking about anything prospective, because defendan's are all going to have to be here through this stage and the return of any verdicts, but that they -- if it's the case, as I have been -- as I have had represented to me, that each defendant did not and does not object to the continuance of the trial during those periods of time when he was not personally in attendance, I think there ought not to be an ambiguity about that. I think the record is about 99 percent complete, but I think it ought to be 100 percent complete.

Is that your understanding, Mr. Just, that you did not and do not object to those portions of the trial that occurred in your absence?

DEFENDANT JUST: No, I have no objection.

MR. NEIGHER: Ronald Betres.

THE COURT: Mr. Ronald Betres, is that your understanding, that you have no objection and did not object to the fact that there were portions of time when you were absent and the trial continued in your absence?

DEFENDANT R. BETRES: Yes, sir. No objections.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Michael Tiche, is that a correct statement of your understanding?

DEFENDANT M. TICHE: Yes.

THE COURT: That you do not object and did not object to those portions of the trial that continued in your absence?

DEFENDANT M. TICHE: That's correct. I had no objection.

THE COURT: Mr. Dennis Tiche, is that your maderstanding?

DEFENDANT D. TICHE: That's my understanding.

THE COURT: You have no objection and did not object to those portions of the trial continued in your absence?

DEFENDANT D. TICHE: None whatsoever.

THE COURT: Mr. Coffey, is that your understanding, that you have no objection and did not object to those portions of the trial that continued in your absence?

DEFENDANT COFFEY: I have no objections.

THE COURT: Mr. Moeller, is that your understanding, that you had no objection to those -- that you had no objection to those portions of the trial that continued in your absence?

DEFENDANT MOELLER: No, sir, I had no objection.

THE COURT: Mr. Peter Betres, is that your understanding, that you had no objection to those portions of the trial
that continued in your absence?

DEPENDANT P. BETRES: You know my answer.

THE COURT: I think I do, but I would like to have it from you so there is no ambiguity.

DEFENDANT P. BETRES: No objections.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Your Honor, I don't believe that there was any time that Reverend Bubar was not here, however, if he was not here, in reply to the Court's inquiry, we have no objection.

To the best of my recollection, I think we were here all the time

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THE COURT: There might have been only some brief absences to just leave the cour room itself. He may have been nearby or something, but I think he was in and out on some occasions.

In any event, Reverend Bubar, I take it from what your counsel says, but I want to hear from you, that you do not object and did not object to the trial continuing during any portion of the time you were not present, is that correct?

DEFENDANT BUBAR: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel may want to review the transcribed portion of the Shaw testimony. Many of them have copies of the direct and their part of the cross examination, and I will leave with the Clerk a full set of the transcribed portion.

MR. KOSKOFF: I would like the Court to tell us what the word "night" means, what time. After six o'clock? I assume it would be sundown, if you want to use the biblical way of doing it, which would be around six o'clock.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I think in reply -- and I am just offering a suggestive thought -- when he said the word "biblical time",
I believe it's from eventide to the morrow, from the mincha to the shacharis, I think that's the appropriate answer.

THE COURT: I will be open to any counsel's suggestion as to those portions of the transcript that they think are necessary to respond to the jury's request.

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MR. ZALOWITZ: I have this query, being that Reverend Bubar all the way through has been penurious and has hot had the availability of the transcripts, except those limited, very limited, portions that were paid for by counsel individually, we don't have that availability, so may I ask that that be made available, also, specifically to Reverend Bubar and myself because we have not had that honored position in this courtroom at any time.

THE COURT: In the first place, it was as open to you as it was to anyone else to make application for transcription at public expense.

Number two, this transcript, as I just indicated, will be filed with the Clerk and will be available. It will not be available specifically to you as you ask, but it will be available to all counsel, and there are enough volumes here so that everybody can be kept busy.

MR. ZALOWITZ: In reply to your statement, I differ with your statement for this reason, the availability of the transcript at government expense was not made available to us, sir.

THE COURT: Did you ever make a request to me that I denied --

MR. ZALOWITZ: Frary request I made with regard to anything here with regard to the position, penuriousness, except the selection of the witnesses which the Court has granted, but all

others have been as if we would have made a position to no avail.

THE COURT: Please refresh my recollection. When did you ever request that any testimony be transcribed for your use at public expense?

MR. ZALOWITZ: In reply, I have never made that request because I knew it was to no avail. That's why I had to personally pay for same to Mr. Gale, and I have the checks to substantiate my position.

THE COURT: I can't help it if you made a wrong prediction on how I would rule.

> MR. ZALOWITZ: This is no prediction, sir. THE COURT: We will stand in recess. MR. EALOWITZ: I object to your statement. (Recess taken.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

(In the absence of the jury, 2:15 p.m.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, there is a note which reads as follows: "Would like Count Three and Four explained with respect to aiding and abetting."

I think the only accurate way to deal with that is simply to give them the instruction on aiding and abetting and give them the instruction on Counts Three and Four.

MR. ZALOWITZ: My comment still stands as I have enumerated previously, even as to same, because it's not total and it's not what they originally wanted, and by the Court's request to them, the Court has conditioned them to come in to make this request. I am objecting tosame, unless the complete charge and the complete law is read to them.

MR. CRAIG: When you say instructions with respect to aiding and abetting, there will be no reference to specific evidence in those instructions? I think there were a number of examples, as you cited, and I would request that those examples with reference to the various parts of the evidence not be given, but just be a straight legal instruction, because it might unfairly highlight certain aspects of the evidence.

THE COURT: I don't think there is a reference in them to evidence. There are probably several references to government contentions.

MR. CRAIG: That's what I mean.

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of Counts Three and Four are,

THE COURT: Frankly, I don't think I can go through and isolate everything, and I don't think it would be clear if I did.

MR. CRAIG: If I recall, there was one sentence.

There would not be that much difficulty in isolating that one sentence. I think you list a certain number of acts that the government contends satisfies the aiding and abetting element, and I think you list three or four acts for the various defendants.

THE COURT: I think I list each contention.

MR. CRAIG: I think you do. I would request that not be part of the instruction.

M CURTIS: I think you gave an instruction on definition of aiding and abetting. I think that would be sufficient --

THE COURT: It's not what they have asked for, because they refer specifically to some explanation on Counts Three and Your, so I just can't tell them about aiding and abetting and leave it at that. I have to tell them what they asked for.

MR. CURTIS: Do you intend only to read material that you have already told them? You're not going to do anything in addition to what you have already done?

THE COURT: No.

MR. SAGARIN: You're going to tell them what the elements of Counts Three and Four are, I understand that?

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THE COURT: It's a little more than the elements. I am going to tell them whatever I told them about Counts Three and Four.

MR. SAGARIN: The note seems to ask for the elements of Counts Three and Four and for an instruction on aiding and abetting.

THE COURT: It does say that. It says, "Would like Counts Three and Four explained with respect to aiding and abetting."

MR. SAGARIN: All you can do is explain the elements and give a charge on -- unless the Court is going to get involved in summarizing the contentions, which I think was prejudicial to start with, and then do it again, particularly when it comes a week after some of the defendants have summed up --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I can appreciate that counsel don't want to have the jury even told what the claim is in this case, but I didn't think I could accurately explain it the first time, and I don't think I can accurately respond to this request. I wouldn't be explaining if I didn't repeat what I said on these topics the first time. I just can't start dissecting it.

MR. SAGARIN: Obviously, I can't except to what you're going to say until we know what it is you're going to say, but it seems to me that if the Court explains, at least in the first instance, what the elements of those counts are and what aiding and abetting means, and even if the Court said the government

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claims that these persons are aiders and abettors on Counts
Three and Four, and these persons are principals on Counts Three
and Four, that's all that has to be done. I don't think you
ought to go behond that.

THE COURT: I disagree. That's a partial explanation, and they have not said, "Give us a partial explanation." They said, "Explain it," and I intend to.

MR. SAGARIN: I would except to the Court doing anything other than simply explaining the elements of Counts Three and Four and giving a definition of aider and abettor and advising the jury who it is the government claims are aiders and abettors on thos counts, and who it is the government claims are principals.

MR. CURTIS: I would join in that.

MR. BOWMAN: I would join in that.

M. KOSKOFF: We join in that, also.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I likewise join in those comments.

THE COURT: You have to make up your mind, Mr. Zalowitz.

You first said you wanted it all, and now you're agreeing with
them that you want less, so you can make -- you can object any
way you want, but I think in fairness to you, you ought to know
which position you're taking.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I am taking the first, deleting and waiving the last.

MR. NEIGHER: I join Mr. Sagarin.

MR. CLIFFORD: On behalf of Mr. Michael Tiche, I join

SANDERS, GALE & RUSSELL Certified Stenotype Reporters Mr. Sagarin.

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MR. CRAIG: I also take exception.

THE COURT: The only other matter I should bring to your attention is that when the Clerk of the Court, this being Friday, distributed to the jurors their checks for their compensation, they made a request of her that a copy of the Handbook for Jurors be made available to the jury.

My inclination is not to honor that request. I don't know is anybody would want me to. It may be we are unanimous on this one.

MR. CLIFFORD: I object to it being given.

THE COURT: Does anybody want it given?

All right.

MR. CRAIG: I am not familiar with the book.

THE COURT: It's here, and so there is no doubt what it is, I will have it marked as a Court exhibit if you want. The problem has come up. As a matter of fact, our Court of Appeals has said that it's permissible to have the jury see it. They said that in U.S. against Allied Stevedoring, 258 F. 2nd, 104. They said it in the context, I believe, of jurors seeing it when they come in for jury duty, and not in the context of seeing it as a specific item during deliberations.

It just seems to me whatever documents for explanation, no matter how innocuous, go to them at this sensitive time, should be only those that are instructions of law that deal with this

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particular case, so for those reasons, I do not think I should --

MR. CRAIG: Have they already seen this?

of them have. They are not required to. It's customary whenever a juror first comes for jury duty that these are available, some take them and read them, some glance at them, and I am sure some ignore them.

MR. SALOWITZ: I have made no commont on same at this moment, but I want to have leave to make a comment as to that portion.

(Jury entered courtroom at 2:25 p.m.)

"Would like Counts Three and Four explained with respect to aiding and abetting."

I will respond to it this way: let me first read that port on of the charge that dealt with aiding and abetting, and then turn to Counts Three and Four. I think that's the way I did it in the charge, and it may be more orderly that way.

What I am about to discuss at this point concerns the three substantive counts, and not the conspiracy count. With respect to each of the substantive counts, there are two ways in which a defendant can be found guilty. One is as a principal: that is, he is found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed the offense himself and to have had the requisite knowledge or intent. The second way a person may be found guilty of an

offense is as an aider or abettor: that is, he is found beyond a reasonable doubt to have aided or abstted someone else to commit the offense, and he has the same knowledge of intent reuigned for conviction as a principal. If a person aids or abets another to commit a crime, then he may be found guilty of the crime even if he did not personally do each act necessary to constitute the offense charged.

Section 2 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
"Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission,
is punishable as a principal."

Under this statute, every person who willfully participates in the commission of a crime may be found to be guilty of that offense. Participation is willful if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.

In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime, it isnocessary that the accused willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture, and willfully particupate in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about: that is to say, that he willfully seek by some act of his to make the criminal venture succeed.

To be guilty as an aider or abettor, a per in must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt to know the objective of the

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venture succeed. He must also be shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have the same knowledge or intent required for conviction as a principal.

A person cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of a crime unless the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime occurred and that some other person performed the acts constituting the crime.

A person cannot be guilt of any crime, either as a principal or as an aider or abettor, simply by being present during the commission of a crime, even if he has knowledge that a crime is being committed. There must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant participated in the criminal offense, that he in some way took action to help make the venture suggest.

If you find with respect to any defendant on any count that he is guilty as an aider or abettor, your verdict is simply guilty on that count, without any special mention of the aiding and abetting statute.

Count Three charges a violation of Section 844(d) of the Criminal Code. That section reads as follows:

"Whoever transports . . . in interstate commerce any explosive with the knowledge or intent that it will be used . . . unlawfully to damage or destroy any building . . . " shall be punished.

Count Three of the indictment charges a violation of this statute by eight defendants, all except Ronald Betres.

I won't read the count again, since you have it with you.

There are two elements of the crime charged in Count Three, each of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before there can be a conviction on that count. First, that a defendant on or about February 28, 1975, did knowingly transport an explosive from Pennsylvania to Connecticut; second, that at the time of the transportation, he knew or intended that the explosive would be used unlawfully to damage or destroy a building.

With respect to the first element, the statute defines "explosive" to include all forms of high explosives, blasting materials, detonators and detonating agents. You would be entitled to conclude that dynamite is an explosive within the meaning of Section 884(d).

With respect to the second element, it is not required that the person who transports the explosive both know and intend that it would be used unlawfully to damage or destroy a building. It is sufficient if he either knew it would be so used or intended it would be so used.

An explosive is used "unlawfully" to destroy a building if it is used in the course of an erson in violation of state law.

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As with Count Two, the requisite knowledge or intent for Count Three must be found to exist at the time of the transportation of the explosive, or prior to such transportation.

Now, in considering Count Three, you will again be concerned with the distinction I previously explained between those who may be found guilty as principals and those who may be found guilty as aiders and abettors. The government's evidence, if you accept it, would tend to establish that the only defendant who actually transported an explosive from Pennsylvania to Connecticut was Connors.

As to all of the other defendants, the government contends that they are guilty of Count Three in that they knowingly aided and abetted Connors in transporting the explosives. Bear in mind the standard. I have previously explained as to what constitutes aiding or abetting. Without repeating them in detail, let me simply remind you that they require that a person know the objective of the criminal venture and by his action participate in it: that is, make it his own or in some way act to help bring about the commission of the offense.

Again, I remind you that an aider or abettor under Count Three must be shown to have the same intent required for conviction as a principal.

You will also recall that I told you a person can be found guilty as an aider or abettor only if someone else,

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the principal, committed the acts constituting the offense. It is not necessary, however, that the principal be found guilty. With respect to Count Three, if you find that Connors did transport an explosive from Pennsylvania to Connecticut, but if you are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew or intended the explosive to be used to destroy a building, then you must acquit Connors on Count Three. But in that event, you could still find some or all of the other defendants guilty of Count Three, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that they knowingly aided and abetted his transportation of explosives. Of course, before you could make such a finding, you would have to find that the defendant whose case you are considering knew or intended that the explosives would be used to destroy Plant 4 and that the defendant took some act to join the criminal venture of transporting the explosives and helped make that venture succeed. The point is that a lack of knowledge on Connors' part is not a defense that precludes a finding of guilt of any other defendant on Count Three.

The government contends that all of the defendants charged in Count Three, other than Connors, did take some action that makes them liable as an aider or abettor of Connors' transportation. They contend that Moeller authorized the payments, that Bubar distributed payments to Peter Betres, that Peter Betres helped dispatch Connors on his way in the early morning hours of February 28, 200 ennis and Michael Tiche helped

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prepare the truck's cargo and load the truck, that Coffey rented the truck, and that Just made a trip to the plant on February 17 with Dennis Tiche to look over the situation. I instruct you that before any one of these defendants can be found guilty of aiding and abetting the interstate transportation of explosives, as charged in Count Three, you must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he took action to become an aider or abettor, as I have defined those terms, sometime prior to the interstate transportation of the explosives. Specifically, even if you find that Just or Coffey or both of them were part of the trio that abducted the guards the night of March 1, that action cannot be considered as aiding or abetting the interstate transportation of explosives because by thattime that transportation had ended. Of course, if you find that either Just or Coffey or both were part of the trio that abducted the guards, you can consider that circumstance in deciding whether to infer that either or both had he requisits knowledge and intent concerning the intended that of the explosives at an earlier time when either or both are alleged have taken some action to aid or abet the transportation.

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So in co. idering the liability of each defendant, other than Connors, as to Count Three, first decide whether explosives were transported from Pennsylvania to Connecticut.

If you find they were, then, as to each defendant, decide whether you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he

took some action before that transportation, but not after it, that aided or abetted that transportation. If he did, then decide whether you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time he took such action, butnot after, he knew that he was aiding or abetting the transportation of explosives and knew or intended that those explosives would be used to destroy building.

Count Four charges a violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 5861(d). That section reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. " Count Four charges all nine defendants with a violation of this statute. I won't read it since you have it in the jury room.

There are three elements of the grime charged in Count Four, each of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt before there can be a conviction on that count. The first element is that a defendant on or about March 1, 1975, did possess a firearm within the meaning of the federal statute. The second element is that his possession was knowing: that is, that he knew that what he possessed as a firearm. The third element is that at the time of possession, the firearm was not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.

With respect to the first element -- presession of &

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firearm -- the statute includes a definition of what constitutes a firearm. Included in that definition is the term "a destructive device, " and "destructive device" is defined to mean "any explosive bomb." In this case, the government contends that the assembled device consisting of barrels of gasoline, sticks of dynamite under them, detonating cord running to the dynamite, and a timing device to activate the detonating cord is the destructive device or firearm that was possessed by the defendants. While dynamite alone does not constitute a destructive device within the meaning of this statute, if you find that there was in Plant 4 on the night of March 1 an assembled device of dynamite, detonating cord, gasoline and a timing device so constructed as to detonate the dynamite and ignite . the gasoline, and cause an explosion and fire, you would be entitled to conclude that this device was a destructive device or fireerm within the meaning of this statute. I should point out that this is the only device possession of which can be considered in connection with townt Pour. There was some testimony about a pistol, but I instruct you that possession of that firearm, if it occurred, is not sufficient to prove the offense charged in Count Pour.

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The possession required for this first element need not be solely the possession of one person. Two or more persons may jointly share possession of an item, so long as each has direct physical control over the item.

As to the second element, knowing possession simply means that the defendant knows that what he possesses is a destructive device. It is not necessary that he know that the device comes within the statutory definition of federal law. Nor is there any requirement that a defendant know that the device must be registered. But there must be evidence that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew what was possessed was a destructive device, in this case, a device capable of causing explosion and fire.

The third element is simply the fact that the device was not registered. You will recall there are in evidence certificates showing that a search was made of the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record and that this search disclosed no record of a destructive device registered to any of the defendants. You are entitled, though not required, to conclude that these certificates establish the third element of this offense.

Again, as with the other substantive offenses, you will have to give consideration to the distinction between principals and aiders or abettors. The government's evidence, if you accept it, would tend to show that the destructive device was possessed in Plant 4 by Dennis and Michael Tiche, along with John Shaw.

The government has also offered evidence to prove that each of the other defendants took some action to aid or abet their possession of the device. I have previously explained what sort

unlike Count Three, the action of any defendant whom you find was in the plant and who participated in the abduction of the guards can be considered by you in deciding whether a defendant acted so as to aid and abet the commission of the offense charged in Count Four. Of course, no defendant can be convicted as an aider or abettor under Count Four unless you find beyon! a reasonable doubt that he knew about the destructive device and intended by his action to participate with others in their possession of that device.

of action and state of mind is necessary to constitute someone

as an aider or abetter. Let me point out that as to this count,

The jury may retire.

(Jury left courtroom at 2:45 p.m.)

the record is clear, I am going to object to the extent the Court again just summarized the government's position and, in effect, gave some credence without giving any balancing effect, without what the defendants' side was, particularly at this late date. One of the problems which comes clear when you hear this charge, particularly out of the context of the other charge, is that the Court has told the jury to assume certain facts, for example, the Court instructing the jury on aiding and abetting said that — I think, referred to a trio of kidnappers, and I am not sure that it's clear from the record that the jury has to find there were three kidnappers. Any of the three people who

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abducted the guards. I think it's -- when the Court said that, it's taking away from the jury their obligation and right to find the facts. It's not altogether clear, the fact that somebody said there were three people doesn't make it a fact that the Court can charge the jury on. But that's a problem with the Court summarising the evidence.

I think that kind of problem goes through each time the Court tells the jury what the government contends, because it doesn't put the other side of the scale and saying you don't have to believe any of that. It's been a week -- almost a week since defense counsel have argued, and the last two -- the last summation was the government's, and then the Court's charge on all of the government's contentions, almost putting it in an imbalance, if you believe this or if you believe this, as if you have to pick one story or another. When the Court does that, it's prejudicial to the defendants.

ment's evidence, if you accept it, if you believe it. I can't repeat that phrase each time I mention something. The language just will be incomprehensible. I just can't believe that from what I said to them in the full charge, and even now, they could possibly think I am telling them to find something as a specific fact. I justdon't think that's, in any way, a reasonable interpretation of what they heard. I understand your point, but I have to disagree with it.

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MR. CLIFFORD: On behalf of Michael Tiche, I join in tue objection of Mr. Sagarin, your Honor.

MR. KOSKOFF: My objection is similar to that of Mr. Sagarin, your Honor. I would say that the government claim is that Moeller authorised the payment. I don't even think that's the government's claim. The government's claim is somewhat different. That may be the thrust of what the government claims, but Mr. Dorsey never said that. Mr. Dorsey said that Moeller was a part of it, but I don't think he even said that the government's claim is that he authorized it.

At any rate, my objection is that -- I think if you said -- which is, of course, the defendant's dispute, as you said, although I agree you did say: if you believe the evidence, so I think it's substantially -- my objection is the same as Mr. Sagarin's.

MR. BOWMAN: I have to reiterate what Mr. Sagarin said, and I think that by the Court putting forth the government's contentions and not the defendants' contentions, just lays tremendous emphasis on the government's proof, and for that reason, I object.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Your Honor, I join with my other confreres and Mr. Sagarin. I think it's a recapitulation of what I said earlier, and as to the Court's analysis thatit's incomprehensible, it may be incomprehensible in the Court's mind, but I doubt if it's incomprehensible in the minds of the jurors,

and I am asserting that by the failure to say that which Mr.

Sagarin had suggested, the jury is becoming conditioned as to the

Court's mind and is being put in the possition of where they are

being eliminated from their own mind in determining the facts

here.

MR. CRAIG: On behalf of the defendant Just, I join Mr. Sagarin's objection. That was the point before your instruction and remains my claim now.

MR. CURTIS: I object, also, your Honor.

(Recess taken.)

THE COURT: They have indicated they wish to adjourn at four o'clock. I took their note to mean that adjourning at 4:00 on Friday meant resuming on Monday, and I assume, but I better be sure, that no counsel wants to insist they come in on Saturday. Is that correct?

MR. SAGARIN: That's correct.

MR. CLIFFORD: That's correct.

MR. SAGARIN: One of the questions concerns this handbook for jurors. I have been advised by the Clark that that is handed out to jurors, and from the question, it appears that maybe one of the jurors was advising another juror possibly what it said in the handbook. I wish they would be instructed not to consult this handbook, because their instructions here, which they were not given in this court, particularly some that deal with a type of Allen charge, don't hesitate to change your mind,

and I really ask for the Court to instruct them not to read anything, particularly this book, or refer to it in any way, if there are appropriate instructions, that the Court give it to them.

(Jury entered courtroom at 3:55 p.m.)

THE COURT: I understood there was a question relayed to the Clerk of the Court for a copy of the Handbook for Jurors, that some of you may have seen when you were first summoned for jury duty in this court.

Obviously, I don't know what may havepred ted that request, and if there is some question in your mind about procedure or applicable law or something that needs to be clarified, in connection with this case, don't hesitate to — when we are next in session — to indicate to me in writing what that inquiry is, so I can determine if it's something that needs to be clarified in connection with this case.

But I am going to reject the request to make copies of that handbook available at this point. It's a general sort of introduction to jury service, but at this stage, you have been impaneled as the jury in a particular case which is governed by particular rules of law, and I think any instruction as to the procedures or law that you receive should be limited to this case and should be only those instructions that I give you in the tion with this case, so that's why I am not going to give you this handbook, and if by any chance some of , u have it or brought it

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664 PROSPECT AVENUE HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 141 CHURCH STREET NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT home, perhaps even months ago when you might have first been called for jury service, I am going to instruct you specifically not to refer to it and, in fact, not to refer to any other source.

Again, it comes back to what I said to you the last two evenings of considering yourselves as if you were sequestered. The only materials you're entitled to have are the exhibits that you have and instructions of law I have given you, and anything else that is made available to you in the courtroom, but nothing is to be referred to at home or anywhere else that doesn't come within the exhibits you get, the testimony you heard and the instructions of law that apply to this case.

Secondly, I should observe I think this point is clear, but I will repeat it so there is no ambiguity: in going over the matters I reviewed with you a couple of hours ago as to the two of the counts and aiding and abetting and things of that sort, as I did during the initial full charge, I refer to certain claims of the government, and I may have referred to certain evidence, and I just out of an abundance of caution want to again emphasize that those are only the contentions of the government. As you know, they are disputed, and that my reference to them is not in any way to be taken as in any way suggesting that any particular fact is so or that any particular contention is well founded or anything of the sort.

What I said to you in the initial charge fully applies, that all issues determining the facts, all issues concerning

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determining the facts are for you, so I think that's clear.

I take it you are ready to go home. I have assumed that you extent your next business day is Monday. If you want to work sooner, I would consider that, but I take it you do not, that you prefer to have a normal weekend, and if that is your preference, we will honor it.

Bear in mind, since there will how be a two-day gap
become you next assemble, that you must continue to be very
scrupulous in considering yourselves as if sequestered, and not
permitting any outside influences to intrude on your considerations; not discussing the case or any aspect of your deliberations
with anybody, so that you return Monday morning at 10:00 a.m.
without any outside suggestion or comment or anything of the sort.

Again, let me remind you, when you return, check in with the Clerk, assemble in the same room you have been using, but wait until all twelve are assembled before actually resuming deliberations.

All right, jury is excused until Monday at 16:00.
(Jury excused at 4:00 p.m.)

All right. Jury is excused until 10:00 a.m. Monday.

WHE COURT: Now, I want to be sure that we make as rapid a determination as possible as to those portions of the Shaw testimony that are responsive to their latest request. A lot of transcript has been filed during the day, and some counsel have their own copies of some portions.

Let me first find out whether any counsel wishes to make use of the Court copy tomorrow in order to suggest portions that need to be read?

MR. SALCWITZ: I have most extenuating circumstances back home, but that doesn't say that I should not completely dedicatedly represent Reverend Bubar, but I am asking a question of the Court, if it will permit me, if the Court will permit me in this courtroom to excerpt out on a tape recoder those portions which I believe are applicable, even today?

THE COURT: You mean you want to read into a tape x recorder the testimony?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Portions that I -- may be necessary to me, sir.

THE COURT: I don't mind if you do that. I just point out that once you do that, that's not going to tell me on Monday morning what parts you want. You can't just hand me a tape and say that iffiliates to it, I will find out what you want.

MR. EALOWITE: My polition is, as I have noted previously, that I have not been able to -- for the reasons I have expressed, on the position of penuriousness, to have ---

THE COURT: Let's be very direct, Mr. Salowitz. The only reason you didn't get the same transcript Mr. Craig got and several others is because you didn't ask for it. It has nothing to do with panuriousness. That's the fact.

MR. FALOWITT: I differ with the Court on that fact.

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THE COURT: You acknowledge you didn't make the request is that right?

MR. EXLOWITE: That I did acknowledge, yes, sir, on my feet. The respected desire that I have is the Court will permit me to -- because if there are excerpts, I will have those portions typed available to argue from with pages --

THE COURT: I don't want argument on Monday. What I would like on Monday is for counsel to say to me, "Our request is page number such and such to page number such and such, lines such and such."

MR. SALOWITS: That's what I intend to do, sir. I will comply with that.

THE COURT: I don't know now you're going to know the page numbers and the line numbers from your tape recorders

MR. SALOWITZ: I will note it on my tape recorder as I read it.

THE CODET: If that's a system that helps you do something, you're certainly entitled to read it into a tape recorder. Do you propose to do that tomorrow?

MR. EALOWITS: I know the hour is late. If need be, I shall be here very early in the morning and shall do it, because I don't want to hold the staff beyond their regular time, so I will have to stay over to accomplish it even tomorrow morning. That's my position.

THE COURT: Well, I am not going to have court personnel

stay here tonight for that purpose.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I respect that and recognize that.

That's why I said I shall do it, if the Court permits ma,

tomorrow morning.

THE COURT: I can have Bruce -- does his key open up the jury room?

(Discussion off the reco: .)

THE COURT: As to Mr. Salowitz's concern, I think we have straightened out at the banch. The U. S. Attorney will take the file copy of the transcript to his office, which will be open tomorrow morning. Mr. Salowitz will be welcome to examine them and dictate into his tape recorder such references as he thinks will assist him in telling me what part of the transcript is responsive to the request of the jury he wants read.

MR. ZALOWITE: "hank you very kindly, and thank Mr. Dorsey and his able staff. And Miss Consiglio.

MR. CRAIG: I have a question as to what your present intention is with respect to the Shaw testimony. Do you anticipate hearing arguments on whether or not it should be admitted to the jury room first on Monday; and secondly, do you anticipate, if it goes to the jury rom, it will go in the form of a transcript or as read?

THE COURT: I understood there was strenuous objection to deverling to the jury transcript, whether full or partial or whatever, that whatever aspects of the Shaw testimony they

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become aware of at this juncture, they should get by nearing it. Is that right?

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MR. DORSEY: It would be an impossible task to do it, anyway, because there are segments that come in and out.

THE COURT: We are over that hurdle. Whatever they get, they will get by hearing it read.

MR. CRAIG: As to the question of whether they get anything, have you made up your hind on that at this point?

THE COURT: No, I have not, because I want to know how much of the transcript is responsive to their request. My guess is that the portions responsive to their request is a manageable portion, but if you all come back to me Monday and says, "Here's what we think is responsive," and it turns out it will take three full days to read it --

MR. DORSEY: Do you want us to provide your Clerk with what we think is 'ncludable within it and responsive to it so you might through their assistance formulate some sort of a position on the response which the others --

THE COURT: If anybody knows now what portions they think are responsive, I will be glad to get those page references

MR. DORSEY: To have you sit on the bench, with all deference --

pertinent pages. It may be that counsel can -- defense counsel can somewhat correlate their efforts. I am not saying they have

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to, but rather than getting nine separate lists, it may be that somehow you can divide up this chore, give something the initial responsibility and then just check with him Monday to be sure he picked up certain things of your own cross examination that you think are critical, but I leave that to counsel.

I would be willing to receive anybody's list of the pertinent pages, but I would like to get that first thing Nonday morning. If any of those are available before we leave today, apparently the government's is, I would be glad to have it.

Are we clear on that?

MR. DORSEY: That means you ought to have in your file copy the transcripts so you can make use of the --

MR. SALOWITZ: I didn't hear that.

THE COURT: He wants to be sure I end up with a copy so I can interpret whatever requests are made and somehow I will endeavor to get hold of a copy.

MR. EALOWITS: Otherwise, it will be deprivation -THE COURT: Do counsel know what we need by Monday?

Do we have any other problems that can be dealt with

(Court adjourned at 4:20 p.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COMMECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

VE.

Criminal N-75-59

CHARLES D. MORLLER, et al.,

Defendants.

New Haven, Connecticut January 19, 197€

Befores

Hon. JON O. NEWMAN, U.S.D.J.

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(In the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: First of all, before I turn to the call calendar, in the criminal case on trial, do counsel have their requests as to the pages of the Shaw testimony that are pertinent Shelton case.

MR. CRAIG: It appears there is going to be no unified defense request. I made a list, and I was going over my list with Mr. Curtis this morning, and there is some disparity in --

THE COURT: Each counsel will have to submit whatever they want.

MR. DOW: Will there be a point at which we can be heard as to whether or not we think the requests are appropriate, or does your Monor just intend to rule?

THE COURT: I doubt if it needs argument.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Your Honor, naturally, I shall abide by the Court's determination, but I thought the Court might want to have argument with regard to the testimony of Shaw, and I am prepared to #5 argue.

THE COURT: I really don't think it's needed. I will be glad to have each counsel's list of pages they think are responsive to the jury's request. Do you have your list?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Please submit it.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir. It is submitted, your Honor,

under protest.

THE COURT: It's what?

MR. ZALOWITZ: It's submitted as enumerated in my position here under protest, sir, but, nevertheless, it is here, without waiving any of the rights of that which I spoke about previously before your Honor.

MR. BOWMAN: I think I speak for all counsel in our basic position on — our basic position is we do not want any of the Shaw testimon; and to the jury, nor do we want any transcripts submirted to them.

THE COURT: You are entitled to certainly let me know that view, but the question remains, if I am to read testimony responsive to their request, do you have a view as to which pages respond to that request?

MR. BOWMAN: Is your Honor saying that we -- thatour request is overruled, in other words, our motion --

THE COURT: No, I thought I made this all clear on Friday. I said I wanted to see what pages counsel thought were necessary to respond to the request. When I saw how much that entailed, I would make a decision whether I thought it was useful to read to the jury that many or that few pages. So the first question is how many pages are responsive?

Now, the government has given me their, and I looked through to make my own tentative judgment. If other counsel don't

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wish to submit a list, they don't have to. But if you want to, now is the time, as I indicated last Friday.

MR. BOWMAN: Without waiving our objection to having any of the testimony read of Shaw, it is our position that if any of the direct testimony is read to the jury, then all the cross examination must also be read.

THE COURT: Again, that really doesn't give me a list.

That just tells me if something is done, something else should be done. I don't know why I can't have a response to the question I asked Friday, but if I don't, that's all right. I will just go on and make my own determination of what pages are responsive, but I thought counsel were insist ng that we had a chance to submit their pages. If they don't want to, they don't have to, but if they want to, now is the time. Do you want to?

MR. BOWMAN: I think that the position of counsel is that if any of the direct testimony is read, the. all the cross must be read, because it bears upon the credibility of John Shaw.

THE COURT: Then, I take it that what you think is responsive to the request is those portions of the direct which I pick out, plus all of the cross? Is that what it amounts to? It still doesn't give me much guidance on what part of the direct is needed.

MR. BOTMAN: There may be some position on direct, if I could confer with counsel for a moment, your Honor.

MR. CRAIG: Without waiving the position that's been

stated by Mr. Bowman, which I, on behalf of Mr. Just, adopt, being that we would request that all cross examination of Shaw 2 be read, if any direct --THE COURT: Your first position is that nothing should 5 l'e read? MR. CRAIG: That's correct. 7 THE COURT: Your second position is if any direct is read, all the cross should be read? 8 MR. CRAIG: Correct. THE COURT: Now, the third position? 10 11 MR. CRAIG: The third position is if you are going to read direct, I have an area of the direct that I would propose 12 you read. The testimony of 10/21, page 130, line 17 to page 13 144 ---THE COURT: Do you have a list you're going to submit? 15 MR. CRAIG: Yes. 16 THE COURT: You don't have to read it. 17 MR. CURTIS: I have a slightly different list, and 18 it's also my third position. 19 MR. CLIFFORD: The defendant Michael Tiche adopts the 20 position of Mr. Bowman and Mr. Craig. 21 MR. NEIGHER: As does defendant Ronald Betres, and for 22 our third position, we will adopt the list of Mr. Curtis, which 23 will be sub tted shortly. 24 25 (Recess taken.)

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664 PROSPECT AVENUE

HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT

(In the absence of the jury.)

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STORY RECEIVED

THE COURT: Gentlemen, I have reviewed the government's request and what I understand are the additional requests of the defendants. I understand your first preference -- your preferences are divided. Mr. Salowitz wants the full testimony read, and the other counsel want no testimony read, and the jury, at least by their latest request, wants some testimony read.

I am going to endeavor to comply with their latest request, and I will have the court reporter read the following referenced pages in the order in which the examination was conducted. From the direct examination, page 127, line 18 to page 144, line 22; page 145, line 16 to page 146, line 13; page 156, line 22 to page 158, line 25. From Mr. Bowman's cross examination on October 22, page 7, line 25 to page 14, line 2; page 16, line 16 to page 23, line 3. From Mr. Craig's examination on the 23rd of October, page 22, line 5 to page 24, line 6; then page 25, line 22 to page 25, line 25; page 26, line 22 to page 28, line 5; page 31, line 5 to page 39, line 8. Then Sagarin's examination on the same date, page 76, line 19 to line 25. Then Mr. Neigher's examination on the 28th of October, page 2, line 6 to page 19, line 24. Then Mr. Clifford's examination on the 28th, page 19, line 7 to line 23. From Mr. Curtis' examination on the 28th, page 9, line 10 to page 10, line 5. Then from Mr. Golub's examination on the 29th, page 8, line 3 to page 10, line 4. Bowman's examination on the 29th, page 2, line 21 to page 4, line

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16. Then Mr. Sagarin's examination on the 20th, page 2, line 4 to page 4, line 11; page 6, line 21 to page 7, line 21. Finally, from Mr. Craiç's examination on the 29th, page 9, line 4 to line 25.

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I think that covers virtually all of what the defendants, with the exception o transvitz, requested. Mr. salowitz's examination that he referenced for me, I am satisfied does not in any respect refer to the jury's request, which is for the sequence of events on the night of the 1st and the ride to New York City in the early morning hours of the 2nd.

I have included some cross examination that bore specifically on those events, particularly identification cross examination.

That's the ruling and the reasons for it.

MR. EALOWITZ: May I say one word? I will be very succinct. So, therefore, my position stands unfetished that I made previously, and in my communication to the --

THE COURT: The record reflects your request, Mr.

MR. ZALOWITZ: And denied totally?

THE COURT: I have granted requests to the extent I just indicated. To all other extents, they are denied.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Thank you, sir. Object to same.

MR. CURTIS: There is objection to the Golub's examination. Mr. Golub is no longer in the case, and it doesn't

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664 PROSPECT AVENUE

HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT

-- referred only to his client.

and several joined in. I am trying my best to accommodate you -
MR. CURTIS: I have objection to Golub material. I

did not request. I don't know who did.

MR. CRAIG: Reading my list, it would appear as though a request were made byme. That was a note that area was relevent. I would withdraw that request and join Mr. Curtis that that not be read. I apologize.

THE COURT: None of the defendants want the referenced portion I just mentioned from Mr. Golub's cross examination?

MR. SAGARIN: That's correct.

THE COURT: That will be omitted.

(Jury ontered courtroom at 12:30 p.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We have endeavored to identify those portions of the transcript of the testimony of John Shaw that are responsive to the last request you made concerning his testimony. That was his account of events with respect to the night of March 1st and the trip to New York in the early morning hours of March 2nd.

There are various sections of the direct examination and cross examination that to varying degrees touch on those events, and the court reporter will read those. He will read them in the order in which the examinations were conducted, so itswill

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he initially the direct examination by the government, and then in the order in which they occurred the different cross examinations of defense counsel that touch on those events.

Bear in mind what I am sure is obvious, that this is not his entire direct textimony nor his entire cross examination. So that whatever considerations are reflected in his testimony that either corroborate his testimony or impeach his testimony, in general, are not being read, but I think these parts are specifically responsive to your request.

It may be there are some other parts that you want to specifically have called to your attention, and if so, we will try to do that, but I think this is responsive to the last request you made.

All right.

(Portions of the testimony of John Shaw read to the

and that's about half way through the portions to be read. We will suspend now and resume at two o'clock.

(Jury oxears) for lunch.)

MR. CRAIG: I didn't know you were going to consider testimony relating to identifications. Consequently, I didn't request a very short interchange between myself and Mr. Shaw about his capacity to identify a photograph of Anthony Just at that meeting in Pittsburgh on April 10. I would, therefore,

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request that small section be included in L :eading.

THE COURT: I have instructed the court: reporter to include the lines you marked, page 10, lines 9 through 22,

(Recess taken for lunch.)

from your examination of October 22.

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664 PROSPECT AVENUE HARTFORD, CONNECT OUT

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Jury present.)

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(Portions of the testimony of John Shaw read to the jury.)

THE COURT: Jury may retire.

(Jury left courtroom at 2:55 p.m.)

THE COURT: If counsel will return to me the lists they submitted this morning, which they retrieved -

MR. ZALOWITZ: I am not returning any list -THE COURT: Your list. All three lists. Those
submitted by Mr. Curtis, Mr. Craig and Mr. Zalowitz will be

marked as the next numbered Court exhibit.

There was another note sent this morning. A juror wants to know could he be excused to make a phone call during the deliberation, and I took the liberty of assuring him he could, so I will mark it so there is no doubt as to what his message was.

MR. ZALOWITZ: May I ask my cross examination of John Shaw, dated October 23, 1975, be marked as a Court exhibit in conjunction with my presentment this morning --

THE COURT: The transcript, in the event of an appeal, will be part of the record, so I don't have to mark it separately. Your exhibit refers to the pages of the transcript.

MR. EALOWITS: The entire transcript, sir, practically, in essence.

THE COURT: Of your cross examination?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir. THE COURT: It will be part of the record, so it doesn't have to become part twice. MR. ZALOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Counsel in this case are excused.) (Recess taken.) THE COURT: Gentlemen, the jury advises they have additional verdicts, and they are coming in shortly. (Jury entered courtroom at 5:10 p.m.) 10 THE COURT: Your note advises you have reached 11 additional verdicts, Mr. Foreman. Would you hand them up, 12 please? 13 Till Cartie Ladies and gentlemen, let me read these 14 verdicts as you returned them, and please listen to be sure 15 that I have correctly reported your verdicts. In Criminal N-75-59, U.S. against defendant David N. 17 Bubar, as to Count One, guilty; as to Count Two, guilty; as to 18 Count Three, guilty; as to Count Four, guilty. 19 Are those your verdicts in that case, so say you all? 20 (Jury answered in the affirmative.) THE COURT: In United States against Dennis C. Tiche, 21 as to Count One, guilty; as to Count Two, guilty; as to Count Three, guilty; as to Count Four, guilty. Are those your verdicts, so say you all? (Jury answered in the affirmative.)

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664 PROSPECT AVENUE HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT

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THE COURT: Are there requests of the jury in those two cases?

MR. CURTIS: Would you poll the jury, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, I will.

(Each juror, upon being asked by the Court, "Are those your verdicts?", answered in the affirmative.)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, I see you have your coats on. I take it you're about to recess for the evening.

Again, letme caution you, as I have during these recesses in your deliberations, to be scrupulous, not to discuss the case or any aspect of it with anyone, nor permit anyone to discuss it with you.

You will be excused now until ten o'clock tomorrow morning. Again, remember to first check in with the Clerk's office and then report to the same jury room you have been using, but to wait until all twelve are assembled before resuming your deliberations.

The jury may be excused used tomorrow morning at ten o'cleck.

(Jury excused at 5:15 p.m.)

MR. CURTIS: I would like to reserve the right to move for judgment of acquittal tomorrow. I would also like to ask that the bond be continued in the same amount pending appeal.

I have been informed that the state police are in

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attendance waiting to arrest Mr. Tiche on state charges. He has never been arrested on the state charges, as of yet, and so I would ask that the bond simply be continued in the same amount pending appeal in this case.

MR. DORSEY: I can't agree with Tiche's bond. Your
Honor may recall the circumstances. I would feel that the
bonds in both instances, where considerably greater motivation no
than existed previously, for which I have no other basis other
than the change of circumstances of the entry of the verdicts,
I feel the bonds should be increased significantly.

I would point out to the Court that at least in the case of -- the defendant Bubar, there is a passport situation that I think also ought to be rectified, the passport should be surrendered at this time.

(Continued on Page 11122, no omission.)

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THE COURT: Do you want to be heard, Mr. Zalowitz?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Your Henor, first, I join with Mr.

Curtis on the petition that he made.

With reference to the appeal, we definitely will file an appeal. I am not going to elucidate, because I think all my statements have been covered at great length before your Honor.

is, I am sure, aware that at each and every time when we were commanded to be here, we were here. At no time was there any defalcation of our appearance. At all times we endeavored to be here promptly. At all times we paid our respected position to the Court.

Reverend Bubar, we contend, notwithstanding the verdict, is innocent, and we shall continue on our quest in God's name to prove same before the appellate division, the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, and even beyond to the Supreme Court of the United States in the event it becomes necessary.

With reference to the amount of the bond, sir, the Court is aware — and I am certain — that it was at great difficulty that we even raised the bond here in the Federal Court; and the bond, we urge and suggest to this Court, should continue because of a very significant position, the position of the fact that Reverend David Bubar is without furds and

penurious.

The Court is aware — and I shall stand dedicatedly alongside of him all the way through — the Court is aware of the position of counsel with regard to receiving any fees or compensation, but I shall stand there, this is my dedication. I shall stand, whichever way the Court decides as to that. If there be a determination in anywise.

people equally, protects the wealthy as against the poor. In this case, there is no question of the fact that Reverend Bubar is not a man of wealth or means. And I might add, his counsel is neither — wealth or means, but we are standing in our position of faith in God that the ultimate decision will be made by the Power greater than I.

I am asking for the continuance, your Honor, of che bail as was set back in Memphis, Tennessee, and at that time, the bail was set in the amount of twenty thousand dollars. At that time, the U. S. Aftorney, Mr. Dorsey, agreed to same. The marshal — the magistrate there, Aaron J. Brown, Honorable aaron J. Brown, thought it was proper; but not one moment did we ever give this Court — I trust we haven't — any concern as to the appearance of Reverend Bubar, for he is a man of God, and a man of God stands firmly against all accusations of morals.

I am saying and urging, sir, that with regard to the passport situation, of which the U. S. Attorney referred to,

should continue as it was a iginally -- without any confiscation thereof. There was never any design or thought of doing anything, and we have not. We have been here, sir, since March the 3rd, 1974, and I personally have been in this court, sir, since March 12th, 1974, right to the present date. No matter what the circumstances of personal nature were, I still am here and have stood here, and shall continue to stay here, or in whatever tribunal this case must go onward and upward to vindication of Reverend Bubar.

I am asking that the passport not be surrendered, for this is a matter that belongs to the State Department and not to the Department of the Judiciary.

when we were in Memphis, Tennessee in the U. S. District Court of the Western District of Tennessee when the same issue was urged by the Assistant U. S. Attorney, Mr. Parish, as to the passport, and judge — the judge there, or the magistrate — for he is not formally in your capacity as a jurist, but he is a U. S. Hagistrate — said, "I know the background of Reverend Dubar. Reverend Bubar will not do anything in which will bring discredit not only upon himself, but upon the clergy, and upon his church and upon God."

fore, in both instances, your Honor, in view of the fact that the Court has recognised, and the Court is aware, and the Court

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has, no doubt, taken judicial notice of the fact that at no time were we, except in the dedication of our presentation, untoward to anyone, that we did meet our commitment of appearance here.

We shall meet our commitment of appearance in whatever tribunal our American system of judiciary and democracy stands for. We shall stand that way.

To impose additional burden upon Reverend Bubar, who has been for at least twenty-nine to thirty days in the correctional center of Bridgeport, without the proper protection and medication and so forth, but, however, through the miracle of the Master, his bail was met in the amount as was designated by the jurist who was presiding in the state courts.

We maintain our innocence, and thank Heaven,
while we are under the flag of the United States, our innocence
reaches not only at this level, sir, but reaches until a final
determination by the highest court of our land, the United
States Supreme Court.

I am asking, sir, in view of these positions that I have brought to the Court's attention — which if I hadn't brought it to the Court's attention, the Court in his own wisdom recognized it, I am certain — you don's have a man here, Reverend Bubar, who has any background of any activity in any form, shape or manner. You don't have a man here who has a desire to harm anyone. You have a man here whose only position is a position of naivete as a minister of the gospel.

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I recognise the difficulties that if one had a significant background of criminal activity, the Court and the U. S. Attorney could be unduly concerned with regard to the bail situation, but not so here. For if there was any such activity, I am certain that the United States Government, with its vast powers and its awesome powers of investigatory position, would have brought it forth before this jury, and yet through the many, many months, not one word of any unfavorable background of Reverend Bubar has been introduced in this court, whether by a 302 report, or whether by anyone taking the stand, or whether by the interrogation of many people who were not even reported in the 302 reports, as to any activities of Reverend Bubar, except the activities in the name of God.

I, therefore, am asking for the Court's grace, for it is within your province, sir, to continue the bail as was in the amount of twenty thousand dollars, which is in existence right now, and that the bond be — and that the passport be not upset in any form.

aware of it, that have been — by reason of the Court's direction, and I respect that direction, and by the Court's determinations, and I respect that in a similar respected wein — but when we look at the overall picture, notwithstanding the verdict of the twelve assembled honored members of the jury, we do have under our democracy the right of appeal. It's not a privilege, it's

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not a grace, it's an absolute right, and a intend to invoke that right in accordance with the way that free men in America are given that right by reason of our laws, our statutes, our position of our conduct of equality of men in the field of law.

respected courtesies by this Court, and likewise by the U. S.
Attorney's office, but, sir, to precipitate a position where
Reverend Bubar could verily become a martyr — and I am not
looking for him to become a martyr, nor a symbol of any
impropriety by reason of the bail being placed in a position
that he could not meet it — for the Court is likewise aware of
the fact that at all times and all conditions, Reverend Bubar
and I have stood firm, stood straight, and stood upright, and
yet, at all times have stood with dignity and respect to the
Court.

of the bail as was, and for your permission to allow the passport to remain in status quo, and for the protection and insulation of that which this Court, under your administration, would and always has respected the right of appeal and the right to assert your individual freedoms and liberties, the right to move forward to the highest court in the land, for the Court here has been very scrupulous and circumspect in his position of the protection of these rights.

Therefore, with humility, I stand here, of course,

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with a heavy heart, but not heavy because the ultimate determination of this case will be under the banner of the Master in Heaven, and the One that controls the world and controls, and is the true Judge, and that is not with any impropriety, the statement I make to your Honor, because I do and always have professed my complete respect.

I am asking for the continuance of the bond, sir, so that we can go forward and protect our interests upward.

the state warrant may create something of a complication, and the determination I make this evening is without prejudice to a further application in the event other arrangements ought to be made to expedite whatever steps the State plans to take, but for the moment, I will alter the conditions of his bond pursuant to the General Statute 3146 but I think the fact of conviction significantly changes the circumstances, and at least for the moment, without prejudice to a motion for modification from Mr. Curtis, but for the moment, I will increase the amount of his bond to one hundred thousand dollars with corporate surety, failing which, he will be remanded to the custod, of the marshal.

With respect to defendant David N. Bubar, I am going to deal with his case pursuant to Section 3148 of the Criminal Code. I am reluctant to detail very much of my reasons at this stage with the jury still considering other cases, but in the event this rule g is to be reviewed, I will at an

appropriate point detail the reasons, but I would rather either wait for the other jury verdict, or if there is a need for review before I submit a written statement of reasons only to counsel and for review by a review court.

I will simply refer to the statutory standard that provides that the conditions of 31ed are not to be used if the Court has reason to believe that one or more of those conditions will not reasonably assure that the defendant will not post a danger to the community, because I think that risk is present in his case, and under the provisions of 3148, I will not admit him to bond pending appeal.

He, of course, has full rights of appeal and may pursue those rights as expeditiously as he can, so this does not prejudice his right to appeal in any way, but the statute is very clear that under certain discumstances, a court ought not to admit a defendant to bail pending appeal.

I think this case falls within the statutory standard, and so the bond that has been in force up until now is revoked and he is remanded to the custody of the marshal forthwith.

MR. EALOWITE: We are without funds. I am asking for the furnishing of the transcripts to us at government expense so that we can forthwith proceed with our appeal to the second Circuit Court of Appeals, sir, and whatever remedy I have with reference to the bail, I want to at least --

THE COURT: Are you referring to the trial transcript? MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: If you will submit the appropriate applica tion, I will act on it.

Decition which we have the

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

VE.

CHARLES D. MOELLER, et al.,

Defendants.

Criminal N-75-59

New Haven, Connecticut January 20, 1976

Before:

Hon. JON O. NEWMAN, U.S.D.J.

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AFTERNOON SESSION

(2:10 p.m.)

THE COURT: The jury has submitted two notes that have to do with scheduling. One refers to leaving today at 4:00 because one juror has some problems, and the second one sort of re-emphasizes that concern, and also calls attention to the weather conditions.

The more substantive note reads: "Request to hear Marie Fobes testimony when she was called for the first time."

Now, my notes indicate that's fairly brief testimony.

I have asked the court reporter to find it, and I don't think it
will take very long to read that to them.

Is there any objection to reading it?
(Jury entered courtroom at 2:10 p.m.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I have your notes, two of which concern scheduling. You request to recess today at 4:00, and the second note gives me a little more reason why you would like to do that, and we will recess at 4:00 today.

Your request concerning testimony reads: "Request to hear Marie Fobes testimony when she was called for the first time."

That testimony is fairly brief, and the court reporter has located it, and he will read you from his notes at this time.

(Testimony of Marie Pobes read to the jury.)

THE COURT: Jury may resume their deliberations.

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(Jury left courtroom at 2:25 p.m.)

TR. ZALOWITZ: Your Honor, I am inquiring as to the answer to the removal of Reverend David Noble Bubar from the Whalley Avenue Correctional Center of New Haven, which I am asserting -- call it, if you will, is a prophecy -- today back to the Bridgeport Correctional Center, I am asking the question, is that the fact or no --

THE COURT: First of all, have you asked the marshal in whose charge this prisoner is?

MR. ZALOWITZ: I would like to ask him now.

THE COURT: Have you asked him?

MR. ZALOWITZ: I have not.

THE COURT: I wish -- you know he is in the custody of the marshal, so if you want to know where he is or where he is liable to be --

MR. ZALOWITZ: I know where he was last evening. I was there.

THE COURT: If you want to know is he going to be moved the first person to ask is the marshal, as you surely ought to know.

MR. ZALOWITZ: You cannot anticipate of every day of every minute unless you are the person known as the marshal.

THE COURT: Mr. Zalowitz, you have received extraordinary cooperation from all the court personnel, far beyond what they need to do.

MR. EALOWITS: No che need to do anything, sir.

THE COURT: But they have. They have put themselves out

MR. EALOWITE: In the interests of justice, not for me personally.

THE COURT: They have done things for you they would not do for any other person because they tried to be helpful.

If you want to know is he going to be moved, the least you can do, before you take up court time in the middle of another trial is just ask the marshal, "Do you have any plans to move him?" He is right here. Go ask him.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Do you have any plans to move --

MR. DIRIENZO: I have been requested by the Connecticut
Department of Corrections to move Reverend Bubar to Bridgeport
Correctional Center. The request was made because they feel
they are better able to core with him at the Bridgeport institution
for some reason, and the prophecy which Mr. Zalowitz claims was
made I am sure is a result of the fact that Mr. Bubar's brother
John works for the Connecticut Department of Corrections, and
he was so informed by some mc ber of that organization.

THE COURT: You wanted to know --

MR. ZALOWITZ: The reason that the Correctional

Department of Connecticut has made Reverend Bubar the scapegoat
in the movement, that's my question, sir.

THE COURT: Just a minute. Before you hurl words

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around in this courtroom, no one has made a scapegoat out of anyone. He is in custody because of the verdict of a jury that found him guilty.

If you want to know why somebody in the Department of Correction has a preference as to where they house prisoners under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, you ask them. You wanted to know is he going to be moved? You just got the answer, yes, he is going to be moved.

Do you have any other business before this Court at this time?

MR. ZALOWITZ: No, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

(Recess taken.)

(Jury entered courtroom at 4:05 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, we will be in recess until tomorrow morning. Again, please faithfully bear in mind the instructions I have given you as you recess for overnight breaks during these deliberations. Don't discuss the case with anyone, nor permit anyone to discuss it with you, and when you resume tomorrow, wait until all twelve of you are reassembled before you resume your deliberations.

All right, the jury may retire, may be in recess until ten o'clock tomorrow morning. We expect you back here to resume your deliberations.

(Jury excused at 4:08 p.m.)

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MR. MALOWITE: Your Honor, may I be heard, please?

THE COURT: If there is some motion or issue?

MR. MALOWITE: There is a great issue, sir.

determination yesterday with reference to bail with reference to Reverend David Bubar. I am asking at this time in the furtherance of the protection of Reverend David Bubar, because the Court, to the best of my recollection, stated that the Court would divulge reasons for holding Reverend David Bubar without bail under the provisions of 3148 as distinguished from 3146.

It is most necessary and cogent to Reverend Bubar's position as of this moment for the Court to — in his own fashion, as he did say that he would, by communication in, I believe, letter or otherwise — disclose to counsel and counsel alone the reasons therefor.

Reverend Bubar is held without bail. I would like to a have the Court, if you will, at your pleasure, whether it be toworrow or whenever the Court feels in extremis and with urgency on the part of the Reverend Bubar for that communication letter so that I can perfect my appeal to the Second Court of Appeals as to the question of bail.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Would the Court kindly, at your pleasure inform me the approximation of when I shall return for the Court's writing or determination in writing, sir, so that I can, with

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propriety and dedication, continue my quest for the bail to be set and not to hold Reverend Bubar without bail, because he is, in accordance with our law, still protected until the final court of this great nation and democracy so determines. He is still innocent, because he has the right of that appeal, and that is the reason I am standing here at this time.

THE COURT: He is certainly not innocent at this moment. He has been convicted by a jury.

MR. ZALOWITZ: That's right, but he is innocent insofar as the final determination of the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Absolutely not. He is guilty until some court reverses that conviction.

MR. ZALOWITZ: The Court and I have an honest — the Court has made his determination and I made my position, but because of the urgency, I am asking for a thought as the Court wishes to inform me as to when that letter will be made available, and to me alone, so that I can fulfill my obligation to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and further at this time, I am also asking, sir, that the sealed document and instrument that has been sealed — that it be opened —

THE COURT: A dozen documents are sealed. Give me a better description than that.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir, the one specifically with reference to the two meetings that I have had with Reverend Bubar and Mr. Gale in your presence, sir, on the issue --

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THE COURT: Your application for subpoenas?

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What do you want done with that?

MR. EALOWITE: I would like to have that seal opened only specifically to the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: That's already the condition under which it was sealed. No further order is needed. It was sealed for review by a reviewing court.

MR. EALOWITZ: Then, that's my position so that is free for me to disclose to the upper court when I make my position for bail as well.

THE COURT: It has nothing to do with the bail issue.

But you can make any arguments to the Court of Appeals that

they wish to hear from you.

MR. EALOWITZ: So, therefore, the seal is -- a sealed document or documents of two meetings here, and as well as in Hartford in your chambers, which I wish to bring forth to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for their advice and instruction, and I am sure they will be made available by this Court for the purpose which I have stated at this moment.

at the moment.

MR. EALOWITZ: They were transcribed, rir, I believe.
Mr. Gale can so answer that. He is here.

THE COURT: Mr. Salowitz, as I told you only earlier

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this afternoon, if you want to know whether some other court official did something or knows somthing, you can ask them. You don't have to take up court time and make a record as you find out information from someone else.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I must make any record that I feel feasible in the protection of my client. I am not constrained to do that, sir.

THE COURT: Not any record that's an utter waste of the Court's time. If you want to know whether Mr. Gale has gotten a chance to transcribe that, you ask him, not on the record, not in open court, just ask him.

MR. MAR. MALOWITZ: I wish it part of my record. He has never refused that -- he has been a very honored man and qualified man, but I still like to have the answer.

THE COURT: This hearing is concluded. And you ask him. He is going to be here working until five o'clock on another case. When he is finished that, you ask him.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir. May I please ask the Court what day I may return for the letter which I have requested for your determination with reference to 3148 as distinguished from 3146 on the question of bail?

THE COURT: When I have the reasons prepared, I will file them; and when they are filed, they will be available to you and to a reviewing court.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Thank you, sir.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

VS.

CHARLES D. MOELLER, et al.,

Defendants.

Criminal N-75-59

New Haven, Connecticut January 21, 1976

Befores

Hon. JON O. MEMMAN, U.S.D.J.

SANDERS, GALE & RUSSELL

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(In the absence of the jury, 10:55 a.m.)

counsel are going to have to be within five-minutes notice of appearance when the court is in session, and failing that, some sanctions are going to have to be seriously considered, because we just each time —and it has happened several times — we keep the jury waiting while all the lawyers and the clients are collected, so that situation is going to have to cease.

Secondly, as of today, one juror has reported that he is ill, although the expectation is that he will be available for service tomorrow.

My inclination is to simply let the jury go home and bring them back tomorrow morning. But I will hear any counsel who have any contrary views.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I do, sir.

THE COURT: You're not in the case at this point, Mr.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I am still in the case --

THE COURT: He is not. I won't hear you on this point.

The verdicts have been returned in your case, and the future

deliberations of that jury are of no concern to you. I wan't even

hear you on this subject. Please be seated.

MR. SALOWITS: What you say, I shall comply, I made my position.

THE COURT: Right now.

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Do any counsel whose clients are still -- have their case being deliberated upon by this jury, have any contrary suggestion, other than to send the jury home for the day?

(No response.)

MR. BOWMAN: One matter before the jury comes in.

There was a press release out of the U. S. Attorney's office
in Pittsburgh regarding the 1971 Campizzi Gardens fire, and the
press release announces that a previously sealed 17-count
indictment that had been returned in October was unsealed, and
that it named Dennis Tiche and John Shaw as defendants, as the
perpetrators of that crime.

Now, the jury is going to be out for a day. It went out over the AP wire service, and the only thing I can say is that I would like to file this and also that the jury should be warned that they should not read the papers concerning this or any other matter.

I would like to file it and I would like it to be admitted as an exhibit in the previously filed motions for dismissal on the grounds of prejudicial publicity, since this has been generated by the government.

THE COURT: It can be marked as a Court exhibit. Is there any local newspaper report containing that?

MR. BOWMAN: There will be.

MR. CLIFFORD: It's a wire service.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. BCYMAN: I think the instructions should include the admonition not to listen to the news, radio, television, especially, since they are in the middle of deliberation, and in view of the government's press release regarding that Pittsburgh indictment.

MR. DORSEY: Your Honor -- there is a notation -- I don't know there is anything more than the normal unsealing of the indicent, of which your Honor has been aware. It's the one we talked about much earlier, and it has been sealed in accordance with my dicessions with you and my request of the judge down there did not keep it sealed once there was a resolution of Dennis Tiche's case, and that's the reason why it has been unsealed at this time.

I don't know that there is a specific press release about it. I don't know there was anything more than the usual press becoming aware --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZALOWITZ: I must stand here --

THE COURT: What request are you making right now?

MR. EALOWITZ: I am making a request, sir, that insofar as the Court had excluded every effort that I made to introduce that fire of — the Campizzi fire, sir, the rights of Reverend Bubar by the exclusion of this Court was highly prejudicial and resulted in a failure of due process of law, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Zalowitz, just a minute, before you

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walk away ---

MR. ZALOWITE: I'm sorry. I apologize.

ago what request you were making. In view of what you said,
the only truthful, honest answer to that question was, "I don't
have a request at this moment, but I have some complaint I want
to put on the record."

MR. ZALOWITZ: I didn't say the word "complaint", sir.

THE COURT: That would have been the honest, truthful answer. And then I would have not had the jury waiting while I heard your complaint. I could have heard your complaint five minutes from now, which would have been just as well.

In the future, sir, when I ask you if you have a specific request to make, you will tell me either that you do or that you don't.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And if you don't, you will wait until I am ready to hear you on your continuation of making the record.

MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If you don't abide by that, you personally will be subject to sanctions for misrepresentations to this Court. Do you understand that?

MR. ZALOWITZ: I heard what you said and I understand what you said.

THE COURT: So there will be no misunderstanling in the

future?

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MR. ZALOWITZ: Yes, sir.

(Jury entered courtroom at 11:05 a.m.)

you no doubt have become aware, one of your colleagues is not present today. He has called in to indicate he is not feeling well. There is a good expectation that he will be available to return for jury service tomorrow morning. So I will excuse you for the balance of the day and ask you to return at ten o'clock tomorrow morning. If I get any indication during the day of a different schedule, I will be in touch with you, but the present expectation is that we will be able to resume with all twe've jurors tomorrow morning, so I will excuse you for today.

Now, in doing that, let me continue to remind you of two things. First, the explicit instruction I have given you not to discuss the case with anybody, but to continue to consider yourselves as if you were physically sequestered so that you won't discuss it with neighbors, friends, anybody in any way; and secondly, let me remind you not to view any newspaper account of this case at all. It probably would really be the safest for -- so there is no misunderstanding arise, is you just really don't look at any paper while you're engaged in jury deliberations. Some great national or international event takes place, probably someone at home will bring that to your attention, but as far as the general run of news, probably it would be just as well

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you don't even look at a newspaper while you're sequestered —
in effect, sequestered — if you were physically sequestered, you
wouldn't see the newspapers, so it's just as well that you not
look at newspapers or listen or watch radio or TV news accounts,
so that no outside force of any sort intrudes on your consideration
of this case or could even be misinterpreted by anybody else
as intruding. It may be something that has no bearing on the
case at all, but someone else might think: well, maybe, they
thought about some article or account or something, so the safest
thing is just to totally insulate yourselves from news accounts
and, as I say, I am sure you're family will — if there is
some event in some far corner of the world that you ought to
know about in another country or somewhere, they will tell you
that.

All right. Please scrupulously heed these cautions.

I make them to you out of my concern that the case be fairly decided, out of my concern that all parties in this case be treated fairly and out of concern that each one of you are fair to each other in maintaining the integrity of your jury deliberations.

The jury is excused until ten o'clock.

(Jury excused at 11:10 a.m.)

THE COURT: I will ask you to remain until the marshal tells us the jurors are out of the building.

(Case adjourned at 11:11 a.m.)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

VS.

CHARLES D. MOELLER, et al.,

Defendants.

: Criminal N-75-59

New Haven, Connecticut January 22, 1976

Befores

Hon. JON O. NEWMAN, U.S.D.J.

SANDERS, GALE & RUSSELL CERTIFIED STEMOTYPE REPORTERS (In the absence of the jury, 10:40 a.m.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, there is a note from the jury.

It is fairly extensive, although, if you will bear with me as

I read it, you will see it narrows down to quite a precise

question at the end, but I will read it in full so you will have

it in mind.

"We are at a juncture in the deliberation of a specific case where it is agreed that a further explanation of a portion of Count Two would be helpful. Because there are several specific charges listed under Count Two, please clarify if it is necessary for a defendant to be found guilty of all charges listed under Count Two, or a portion of the charges. We are referring to the section which reads, 'Did travel and cause travel in interstate commerce with the intent'" — and the "intent" is underlined — "'to promote, manage, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, and did'" — and those two words are underlined — "'perform acts to promote, manage, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management and carrying on of such unlawful activity.'

"If a defendant travels interstate not intending to commit a crime, then does commit a crime, is he liable to be found guilty of Count Two?"

MR. KOSKOFF: You can give a one-word charge on that.

THE COURT: Certainly, the answer to the precise question is no, and the only thing I am even considering saying in addition to is that when they refer to several charges in Count Two, what

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and perhaps I just ought to explain to them that what they have identified as the traveling and the intent and the act thereafter are not different charges, they are different elements, and that each element has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, the answer to their specific question is no.

MR. CLIFFORD: I think they should be told unless they find each element proven, then the verdict has got to be not guilty.

THE COURT: Well, all right. I think that's --HR. CLIFFORD: I think that's the law.

THE COURT: It clearly is, and that's what I told them.

I am just trying to be sure they don't think as to this or any
other counts that there is more than one charge in one count.

Obviously, it doesn't matter to them whether the word is "element'
or "charge", but it justmight be in the interests of clarity to
avoid any misunderstanding on that. All right.

(Jury entered courtroom at 10:50 a.m.)

THE COURT: I have your note which reads as follows:

"We are at a juncture in the deliberation of a specific case where it is agreed that a further explanation of a portion of Count Two would be helpful. Because there are several specific charges listed under Count Two, please clarify if it is necessary for a defendant to be found guilty of all charges listed under Count Two, or a portion of the charges. We are

referring to the section which reads, 'Did travel and cause travel in interstate commerce with the intent'" — underlined — "'to promote, manage, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, and did'" — those two words are underlined — "'perform acts to promote, manage, carry on and facilitate the promotion; management and carrying on of such unlawful activity.'

"If a defendant travels interstate not intending to commit a crime, than does nommit a crime, is he liable to be found guilty of Count Two?"

The simple answer is no.

Let me just say a few words so that we are clear about some of the terminology. Your question talks about several charges being included in Count Two. Actually, there is only one charge. Count Two itself is a single charge, but in order for there to be a conviction under that count, or under any count, for that matter, each of the elements that constitute that crime have to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, I think what you have referred to as charges are the same thing I refer to as elements, and as you indicated in your question, there are those three elements to count Two: the interstate travel itself, having the requisite intent at the time of the travel, and thereafter performing an act to promote, manage, carry on, et cetera, or facilitate the promotion, et cetera, of an arson. Three elements: the travel, the intent at the time of the travel, and the act thereafter that promotes an arson.

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Those are three elements of the crime charged in Count Two.

Each element has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before there can be a conviction.

If any element is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to a particular defendant, there must be a verdict of not guilty as to that defendant.

so that -- so all of that leads to the answer I started with, because your specific question is: "If a defendant travels interstate not intending to commit a crime" -- I should pause there, because when you say "a crime", I assume your question is about the crime charged in Count Two, in other words, he must have the intent to promote, manage, carry on, et cetera, the commission of arson in violation of state law.

So your question, again, says: "If a defendant travels interstate not intending to commit a crime, then does commit the crime" -- by which I take it you mean then does commit an act, which is the third element of Count Two -- "is he liable to be found guilty of Count Two?" And, as I said, the answer is no, because, as you put the question, he did not have the requisite intent at the time of the travel and, therefore, must be acquitted of Count Two. Is that clear?

All right, jury may resume their deliberations.

(Jury left courtroom at 10:55 a.m.)

THE COURT: The note will become the next Court exhibit.

Any exceptions to that instruction?

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MR. CLIFFORD: No.

(Recess taken.)

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THE COURT: We will stand in recess.

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(In the absence of the jury, 4:30 p.m.)

THE COURT: There is a note from the jury that says,

"We have reached a verdict on Charles Moeller."

(Jury entered courtroom at 4:35 p.m.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, your note indicates you have reached an additional verdict.

Would the Foreman hand the form to the bailiff, please?

Ladies and gentlemen, t let me read the verdicts to

you in United States against Moeller, "We find as to Count One,

not guilty; Count Two, not guilty; Count Three, not guilty;

Count Four, not guilty."

Are those your verdicts?

(Jury answered in the affirmative.)

THE COURT: Any request of the jury?

MR. DORSEY: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I gather you just as soon recess at this point since it's virtually your quitting hour for the day, and resume tomorrow morning at ten o'clock.

Again, please scrupulously observe the cautions I have given you each evening about not discussing the case, nor reading about it or permitting anyone to discuss any aspects of it with you.

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Return tomorrow at ten o'clock. Wait until all of your group are present, and then resume your deliberations at that time. Have a safe journey home. See you tomorrow morning at ten o'clock.

(Jury excused at 4:35 p.m.)

MR. KOSKOFF: May the bond be discharged?

THE COURT: The defendant Moeller's bond is discharged and he is released from all custody or connection with this case.

(Court adjourned.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

we .

CHARLES D. MOELLER, et al.,

Defendants.

Criminal N-75-59

New Haven, Connecticut January 23, 1976

Before:

Hon. JON O. NEWMAN, U.S.D.J.

SANDERS, GALE & RUSSELL CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS

750 MAIN STREET HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT

141 CHURCH STREET NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT (In the absence of the jury, 2:30 p.m.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, there is a note from the jury which reads as follows: "With regard to a specific case, request a review of aiding and abetting on Counts Three and Four."

I would propose to respond to that, as I did to a similar request, that I think at that time focus. In Counts
Two and Three --

MR. CRAIG: It was Three and Four.

MR. DORSEY: It was Three and Four.

THE COURT: Then, I was about to say I was going to respond similarly. I will propose to respond identically by telling them the elements of aiding and abetting, and what I told them about Counts Three and Four.

MR. CRAIG: Your Honor, I would object similarly to the relaying again of the evidence in the way that you did the prior time. Because I think it ought --

THE COURT: I understand that point, but as I indicated then, I don't think it's evidence, but I don't think I can explain to them the discintions between principal and aider and abettor without, as I did in the initial charge, giving them some understanding of the crime.

I will emphasize, as I did at the conclusion, that, of course, this statement of a claim is only that, and that all those claims are disputed, but I just -- when they want clarification, I don't think I can just respond by abstracts.

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MR. CRAIG: If I could propose an alternative way of looking at that request. It is a request for an instruction on the law, and I would have no opposition to an instruction on the law with respect to aiding and abetting in those two counts, but when you recite and list the government's contentions without identically reciting and listing the evidence that the defense uses to dispute the government's contentions —

THE COURT: You're comparing apples and oranges.

The contentions aren't evidence, and every time I tell them a contention of the government, I am not going to tell them all the evidence the defendants say is opposed to that. I am not telling all the evidence the government says supports that contention.

I am trying to have them understand what it is the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Obviously, that involves talking a little more about the government's claim than your claim for the obvious reason that only the government has to prove anything and you don't. And that — we had the discussion before. I understand you disagree, but I don't think we are going to illuminate that dispute very much more.

MR. BOWMAN: The only thing I would like to add to Mr. Craig's argument, with which I join, is that this is the third time that your Honor is instructing them on aiding and abetting. It's no longer a clarification, it's repetitive instruction on your Honor's summary of the evidence, and for that reason, I

object, and that it is not a clarification.

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THE COURT: All right.

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your Honor.

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24 25 -- at least give the same instruction it gave just before the jury was discharged the last time.

MR. CLIFFORD: For the record, on behalf of Michael Tiche,
I join in the arguments of Mr. Craiç and Mr. Bowman.

MR. NEIGHER: I join in Mr. Craig's objection, too,

same arguments we made before, and would ask that the Court give

MR. SAGARIN: Your Honor, I would like to preserve the

(Jury entered courtroom at 2:35 p.m.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I have your note which reads: "With regard to a specific case, request a review of aiding and abetting on Counts Three and Four."

Now, since that inquiry doesn't identify any particular inquiry, and I am not suggesting it needs to, but I just want to indicate why I am doing what I am about to do.

I think the only way I can give the review you have asked for is to again go over the rules of law that concern aiding and abetting, and then turn to the elements of Counts Three and Four, which also contains some discussion of the relationship of aiding and abetting to Counts Three and Four, so I will do it that way.

Let me say at the outset, so there is no misunderstanding, in explaining these aspects of the rules of law, I will make some

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reference to certain contentions of the government, certain claims that the government makes. Now, in alluding to those, I want you to clearly understand that any claim of the government in that regard is disputed by the defendants.

Now, I am not going to pause to summarize any of the evidence, either evidence that supports the claim or refutes it, but I want you to understand that in referring to a claim, I am not suggesting in any way that that claim is made out, nor do I want you to forget that that claim is, in fact, disputed, but I am simply trying to illustrate the way the claims are to be considered according to the standards of law, but whether those claims are made out or not is the question you have to decide, and my referring to them is not in any way to be taken to indicate that they are established at all.

Now, first, as to aiding and abetting, with respect to each of the substantive counts, there are two ways in which a defendant can be found guilty. One is as a principal: that is, he is found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed the offense himself and to have had the requisite knowledge or intent. The second way a person may be found guilty of an offense is as an aider or abettor: that is, he is found beyond a reasonable doubt to have aided or abetted someone else to commit the offense and he has the same knowledge or intent required for conviction as a principal. If a person aids or abets another to commit a crime, then he may be found guilty of the

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crime even if he did not personally do each act necessary to constitute the offense charged.

Section 2 of the Criminal Code proves: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."

Under this statute, every person who willfully participates in the commission of a crime may be found to be guilty of that offense. Participation is willful if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard thelaw.

In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that the accused willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture, and willfully participate in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about: that is to say, that he willfully seek by some act of his to make the criminal venture succeed.

shown beyond a reasonable doubt to know the objective of the criminal venture and to intend by his actions to help make that venture succeed. He must also be shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have the same knowledge or intent required for conviction as a principal.

A person cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting

the commission of a crime unless the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime occurred and that some other person performed the acts constituting the crime.

A person cannot be guilty of any crime, either as a principal or as an aider or abettor or as a coconspirator simply by being present during the commission of a crime, even if he has knowledge that a crime is being committed. There must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant participated in the criminal offense, that he in some way took action to help make the venture succeed.

If you find with respect to any defendant on any count that he is guilty as an aider or abettor, your verdict is simply guilty on that count, without any special mention of the aiding and abetting statute.

Now, with respect to Count Three, the count charges a violation of Section 844(d), and that reads:

"Whoever transports . . . In interstate commerce any explosive with the knowledge or intent that it will be used . . . unlawfully to damage or destroy any building . . . " shall be punished.

And Count Three charges a violation against -- well, as of the time, I said against all eight defendants, the accurate way at the moment would be to say against all of the defendants whose cases you are now considering, except Ronald Betres. Ronald Betres is not charged in Count Three.

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There are two elements of the crime charged in Count Three, each of which must be prover beyond a reasonable doubt before there can be a conviction on that count. First, that a defendant on or about February 28, 1975, did knowingly transport an explosive from Pennsylvania to Connecticut; second, that at the time of the transportation, he knew or intended that the explosive would be used unlawfully to damage or destroy a building.

With respect to the first element, the statute defines "explosive" to include all forms of high explosives, blasting materials, detonators and detonating agents, and you would be entitled to conclude that dynamite is an explosive within the meaning of the statute.

With respect to the second element, it is not required that the person who transports the explosive both know and intend that it would be used unlawfully to damage or destroy a building. It is sufficient if he either knew it would be so used or intended it would be so used.

An explosive is used "unlawfully" to destroy a building if it is used in the course of an arson in violation of state law.

As with Count Two, the requisite knowledge or intent for Count Three must be found to exist at the time of the transportation of the explosive, or prior to such transportation.

in considering Count Three, you will again be concerned

with the distinction I previously explained between those who may be found guilty as principals and those who may be found guilty as aiders and abettors. The government's evidence, if you accept it, would tend to establish that the only defendant who actually transported an explosive from Pennsylvania to Connecticut was Connect.

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As to all of the other defendants, the government contends that they are guilty of Count Three in that they knowingly aided and abetted Connors in transporting the explosives. Bear in mind the standards I have previously explained as to what constitutes aiding or abetting. Without repeating them in detail, let me simply remind you that they require that a person know the objective of the criminal venture and by his action participate in it: that is, make it his own or in some way act to help bring about the commission of the offense.

And again I remind you that an aider or abettor under Count Three must be shown to have the same intent required for conviction as a principal.

You will also recall that I told you a person can be found guilty as an aider or abettor only if someone else, the principal, committed the acts constituting the offense. It is not necessary, however, that the principal be found guilty. With respect to Count Three, if you find that Connors did transport an explosive from Pennsylvania to Connecticut, but if

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you are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew or intended the explosive to be used to destroy a building, then you must acquit Connors on Count Three. But in that event, you could still find some or all of the other defendants guilty of Count Three, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that they knowingly aided and abetted his transportation of explosives.

Of course, before you could make such a finding, you would have to find that the defendant whose case you are considering knew or intended that the explosives would be used to destroy Plant 4 and that the defendant took some act to join the criminal venture of transporting the explosives and helped make that venture succeed. The point is that a lack of knowledge on Connors' part is not a defense that precludes a finding of guilt of any other defendant on Count Three.

The government contends that all of the defendants charged in Count Three, other than Connors, did take some action that makes them liable as an aider or abettor of Connors' transportation. They contend that Moeller authorized the payments, that Bubar distributed payments to Peter Betres, that Peter Betres helped dispatch Connors on his way in the early morning hours of February 28, that Dennis and Michael Tiche helped prepare the truck's cargo and load the truck, that Coffey rented the truck, and that Just made a trip to the plant on February 17 with Dennis Tiche to look over the situation. I

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guilty of aiding and abetting the interstate transportation of explosives, as charged in Count Three, you must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he took action to become an aider or abettor, as I have defined those terms, sometime prior to the interstate transportation of the explosives. Specifically, even if you find that Just or Coffey or both of them were part of the trio that abducted the guards the wight of March 1, that action cannot be considered as aiding or abetting the interstate transportation of explosives because by that time that transportation had ended. Of course, if you find that either Just or Coffey or both were part of those that abducted the guards, you can consider that circumstance in deciding whether to infer that either or both had the requisite knowledge and intent concerning the intended use of the explosives at an earlier time when either or both are alleged to have taken some action to aid or abet the transportation.

So in considering the liability of each defendant, other than Connors, as to Count Three, first decide whether explosives were transported from Pennsylvania to Connecticut.

If you find they were, then, as to each defendant, decide whether you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he took some action before that transportation, but not after it, that aided or abetted that transportation. If he did, then decide whether you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time he took such action, but not after, he knew that he was

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aiding or abetting the transportation of explosives and knew or intended that those explosives would be used to destroy a building.

Count Four charges a violation of Title 26, United
States Code, Section 5861(d). That section reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to receive or possess a
firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record." Count Four charges all of
the defendants whose cases you are now considering with a
violation of this statute.

There are three elements of the crime charged in Count Four, each of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt before there can be a conviction on that count. The first element is that a defendant on or about March 1, 1975, did possess a firearm within the meaning of the federal statute. The second element is that his possession was knowing: that is, that he knew that what he possessed was a firearm. The third element is that at the time of possession, the firearm was not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.

With respect to the first element -- possession of a firearm -- the statute includes a definition of what constitutes a firearm. Included in that definition is the term "a destructive device," and "destructive device" is defined to mean "any explosive bomb." In this case, the government contends that

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the assembled device consisting of barrels of gasoline, sticks of dynamite under them, detonating cord running to the dynamite, 2 and a timing device to activate the detonating cord is the destructive device or firearm that was possessed by the defendant -. While dynamite alone does not constitute a 5 destructive device within the meaning of this statute, if you find 6 that there was in Plant 4 on the night of March 1 an assembled 7 device of dynamite, detonating cord, gasoline and a timing device 8 so constructed as to detonate the dynamite and ignite the 9 gasoline, and cause an explosion and fire, you would be entitled 10 to conclude that this device was a destructive device or firearm 11 within the meaning of this statute. I should point out that this 12 is the only device possession of which can be considered in 13 connection with Count Four. There was some testimony about a 14 pistol, but I instruct you that possession of that firearm, if 15 it occurred, is not sufficient to prove the offense charged in 16 17 Count Pour .

The possession required for this first element need not be solely the possession of one person. Two or more persons may jointly share possession of an item, so long as each has direct physical control over the item.

As to the second element, knowing possession simply means that the defendant knows that what he possesses is a destructive device. It is not necessary that he know that the device comes within the statutory definition of federal law. Mor

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must be registered. But there must be evidence that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew what was possessed was a destructive device, in this case, a device capable of causing explosion and fire.

was not registered. You will recall there are in evidence certificates showing that a search was made of the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record and that this search disclosed no record of a destructive device registered to any of the defendants. You are entitled, though not required, to conclude that these certificates establish the third element of this offense.

Again, as with the other substantive offenses, you will have to give consideration to the distinction between principals and aiders or abettors. The government's evidence, if you accept it, would tend to show that the destructive device was possessed in Plant 4 by Dennis and Michael Tiche, along with John Shaw. The government has also offered evidence to prove that each of the other defendants took some action to aid or abet their possession of the device. I have previously explained what sort of action and state of mind is necessary to constitute someone as an aider or abettor. Let me point out that as to this count, unlike Count Three, the action of any defendant whom you find was in the plant and who participated in the

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abduction of the guards can be considered by you in deciding whether a defendant acted so as to aid and abet the commission of the offense charged in Count Four. Of course, no defendant can be convicted as an aider or abettor under Count Four unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about the destructive device and intended by his action to participate with others in their possession of that device.

Unless your inquiry subsequently turns out to be more pointed than what you have made thus far, I think that's a sufficient review to be responsive to your request, and let me simply again emphasize that in referring to any claims of the government, you will understand those claims are all disputed, and that my reference to any aspect of the government's contentions is without bearing on any of the issues you have to decide.

All right, the jury may retire.

(Jury left courtroom at 2:55 p.m.)

MR. BOWMAN: We except to your Honor's reading of that testimony -- of your charge to the jury.

MR. SAGARIN: I joint in that.

MR. CLIFFORD: I object to that, also.

(Recess taken.)

(In the absence of the jury, 4:05 p.m.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, the jury has indicated -- the specific note is from one of the jurors who apparently is not feeling very well at the moment and so they would like to go home

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for the day.

MR. CRAIG: The defendant Just has no objection.

(Jury entered courtroom at 4:10 p.m.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, there is a note indicating that one of the jurors is not feeling very well, and since it's near the end of the day, you are certainly entitled to go home, to return Monday morning ten o'clock. I hope that everybody will be feeling well on that occasion, so that the jury can resume its deliberations.

Again, please scrupulously abide by the cautions

I have given you about not discussing the case with anyone at
home at all, and also let me remind you, particularly during
this time when you are in the process of deliberating, to be
very careful not to look at any newspaper accounts at all, radio
or television.

I think the safest approach, as I indicated before, is just to avoid newspapers, in general, for the time when you are deliberating. So, with your adherence to those instructions, we will see you Monday morning. Again, when you do reconvene, wait until all twelve are assembled before you resume deliberations, and jury is excused until ten c'clock Monday morning.

(Case adjourned.)

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141 CHURCH STREET NEW HAVEN. CONNECTICUT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

WE

CHARLES D. MOELLER, et al.,

Defendants.

Criminal N-75-59

New Haven, Connecticut January 26, 1976

Befores

Hon. JON O. NEWMAN, U.S.D.J.

SANDERS, GALE & RUSSELL

750 MAIN STREET HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 141 CHURCH STREET NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT (In the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: There is a note from the jury which reads as follows: the words "On Count Three" appear in parentheses at the top, and then the notes reads: "If he had the knowledge and intent of explosives prior to it being transported interstate, but did not assist physically in any way to transport the explosives, is he aiding and abetting?"

They seem to be placing emphasis on "physically".

They underlined it in the note. And it may be that they are inferring that there is a certain type of activity that constitutes aiding and abetting, which is not necessarily so, in other words, if by physically doing something, they mean driving a truck, pumping gas into a truck, loading barrels onto a truck, while that would be aiding and abetting, that's not the sole definition of aiding and abetting. You can participate in a venture without ever touching the truck physically.

Since they have put it in terms of that word

"physically", I have to respond to that in some way. I, of

course, have to indicate there has to be some action by the

person. It can't just be presence when others are doing

something, but that it doesn't have to be action that touches

the truck or loads a barrel or something like that, but it must

be action by which the actor demonstrates that he is participating

actively and knowingly in the venture that produces the

transportation.

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MR. CRAIG: I have a number of questions to ask your the Honor. It seems to me that the contentions that you list when you read these instructions about all have to do with physical actions related to the transportation of the truck, not just the venture that produced the transportation. I would think that would be a major distinction between the transportation versus the venture that produced the transportation.

THE COURT: What do you suggest be said?

MR. CRAIG: No.

MR. BOWMAN: I have a further problem, and that is that it's my view that it's the question for the jury, whether or not specific action is -- falls within the definition of aiding and abetting, and what I am afraid of, if your Honor gives them an additional instruction that instructs them that if you find that particular -- that somebody has done particular action, and that's aiding and abetting, I feel that the Court is usurping their function. It's for them to decide whether or not filling the gas is aiding and abetting, because somebody theoretically could have put the gas in the truck, but not known what the cargo was, and not known that the truck was intended to transport the explosives.

THE COURT: I am cortainly not going to let them suffer under that misapprehension, but their note itself indicates they are not suffering under that misapprehension, because they refer to a person who has knowledge and intent concerning the

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explosives, so I don't think that's the problem we have.

MR. DORSEY: Would your Honor read the note in its entirety for me one more time, please?

THE COURT: It says: "If he had the knowledge and intent of explosives prior to it being transported interstate, but did not assist physically in any way to transport the explosives, is he aiding and abetting?"

MR. SAGARIN: I think at this point all the Court ought reasonable to do is just reread the jury the charge on the aiding and abetting, and only that portion without repeating the evidence, but simply tell them what aiding and abetting is.

I think it would be improper to answer that question, because you have to speculate on a number of possibilities that they can be considering, and I think any answer to that question necessarily would cut off some of those possibilities and may be misleading to the jury.

I am not sure that question should be answered any other way. They have been instructed three times what aiding and abetting was, and those instructions apply. I would object to it in --

Mi. CLIFFORD: On behalf of my client, I join Mr. Sagarin in his observations.

MR. DORSEY: Your intention is to tell them if they find intent, thatit is not necessary that physical participation or assistance is necessary in order to find culpability .s an

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141 CHURCH STREET NEW HAVEN. CONNECTICUT aider and abettor?

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THE COURT: Well, no, I don't think I can say that to them, because the person has to physically do something.

He can't just remain inert and think evil thoughts. That would not be enough.

(Jury entered courtroom at 12:40 ptm.)

your note which reads as follows: At the top it says in parentheses: "On Count Three", then it reads: "If he had the knowledge and intent of explosives prior to it being transported interstate, but did not assist physically" — which you have underlined — "in any way to transport the explosives, is he aiding and abetting?"

Let me respond in this way: I trust you have in mind what I said to you before about what constitutes aiding and abetting, the type of participation that can constitute someone as an aider and abettor, and the knowledge and intent that is required.

Now, you focused, by your question, on this word "physically", and as you put it, if the person did not assist physically in any way to transporting the explosives. If by physically assisting you have in mind doing something physically with the truck itself, that's not necessary. In other words, a person who drives it could be said to physically aid the transportation. Somebody who might fill up the gas tank, if he knew

what the venture was all about, might be said to physically aid the transportation. In that sense, physical action is not necessary in the sense of physically doing something to that truck. Other things could be considered and could be found by you to be aiding and abetting.

Let me, without in any way -- without asking you to disregard anything I said about aiding and abetting, let me just focus on one paragraph that I think gives perhaps the flavor of it that might be helpful.

In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the accused willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture and willfully participate in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about: that is to say, that he willfully seek by some act of his to make the criminal venture succeed. In other words, some physical action is necessary. A person cannot be a bystander, a spectator, evan if he knows what's going on, that's not aiding and abetting. To be an aider and abettor, the person must be a participant.

He certainly must do something by which he joins that venture, helps bring it about, indicates that he is doing something to help make that venture succeed. He doesn't have to physically touch the truck, but he must take some action which you find indicates to you beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted so as to participate to assit, to help bring about the transportation of the explosives.

If he took that kind of action, and the other elements

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of the crime were established, and he had the requisite knowledge and intent, then he could be found guilty as an aider and abettor.

If he didn't take action that really shows he participated in helping to bring it about, that he — or that he joined the venture himself, ir he didn't take that kind of action, then he is not an aider and abettor.

Does that somewhat clarify the distinction?

I see some of you nodding yes, so I will leave it at that.

All right, the jury may be excused.

(Jury left courtroom at 12:45 p.m.)

MR. CRAIG: I will take an exception to the instruction for the reasons stated before the jury came in.

MR. SAGARIN: Your Honor, same exception for the reasons stated before. I join with Mr. Craig with his reasons as well.

MR. CLIFFORD: On behalf of Michael Tiche, I take exception as stated previously by Mr. Sagarin and Mr. Craig.

MR. BOWMAN: I join also with Mr. Sagarin and Mr. Craig on behalf of Mr. Coffey.

THE COURT: Do the four counsel to whom Count Three applies - I understand you have excepted - is there anything you think should be said that, in your view, more accurately or more correctly states the law than I have endeavored to say it?

MR. CRAIG: I think the proper answer would be no. think there must be some action physically to assist in the transportation, and that's just the request that I made prior to

instruction.

THE COUPT: All right, if that's the request, I don't think I will charge further, but I don't think I said anything different than that. I don't think I in any way let them find someone guilty as an aider in the matter in the absence of some action by that person. But it just seemed to me their use of the word "physically" may well be an unnecessarily narrow one. I think that's why they asked the question, or that may be well why they asked the question, and since I am satisfied that what I said doesn't differ from your view of what's required, I don't think there is any need to instruct further. All right.

(Recess.)

(In the absence of the jury, 4:00 p.m.)

THE COURT: There is another note which you have had a chance to see at the bench. It can't be literally complied with, even if that were advisable, because while the portions of the original charge are written out and available for the jury to see, responses to questions have not been transcribed.

My inclination at the moment is not to try to respond to this by trying to select portions of transcript or portions of the charge, but rather to deal with the very first observation they make, that there are many different interpretations and to point out to them that if on any aspect of the law there is a different interpretation, then they ought to submit a very precise inquiry so that difference can be resolved by me, because the issues

of law are not to be left to their different interpretations.

I can tell them that portions of the original charge are available, although I would rather not make any decision about sending them portions until I know exactly what their problem is, and I just don't know from this note.

MR. SAGARIN: Our concern with the Court's proposed response is, in effect, it invites special interrogatories and special verdicts, which the Court didn't see fit to either charge the jury on -- and at this late date, we think it would confuse the issue and narrow the issues of fact which are involved.

We would oppose, I think, on behalf of all the defendants, the Court further charging the jury in the absence of some specific — in some request that calls for a further charge. The Court told them about aiding and abetting three times — four times, as I count now — and each time it seems to be — as we get farther and farther away from the legal arguments, some of which were two and a half weeks ago — I think can only cause more focus on the government's case and not on the defendant's case, so we would oppose the Court telling the jury anything with respect to this request.

I think all the Court can simply say, if there are portions of the charge that you want reread, the Court will consider those requests, but to invite what amounts to special requests or requests for special findings --

THE COURT: No. I don't plan to sav anything to them to

in any way request a special finding on interrogatories or anything of the sort.

MR. SAGARIN: It also seems that the Court's proposed response might have -- effect the jury -- an individual juror's determination that he is free to find the facts as he feels them to have been proved, and I know the Court was talking about the law, but there is sort of gray areas in here, particularly in light of the last questions which dealt with what a person phsyically did, and I think that the Court -- the proposed response to the jury might inhibit a juror from making -- from knowing that he is free to make independent determinations of fact.

MR. CRAIG: My one concern is that the specific requests that probably will be coming back as a result of the response that I think you intend to give to that question may mix up the fact and the law, the issues of facts and issues of law, and the way I see that happening would be something like this: for the jury would come back and say, "Does it satisfy aiding and abetting on Count Three if we find that one defendant rented the truck?" You're going to end up with some kind of combination factual question and legal question, which can't help but get into a comment by your Honor on the evidence as well as on the government's contestions, which is something that we have been opposed to all the way through.

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THE COURT: I can't predict what question they are going to ask next. If that's the question they ask next, they may be entitled to an answer.

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MR. CRAIG: My problem with the proposed answer that you have got, it's an invitation to a series of questions that relate to specific factual disputes as to whether the facts alleged by the government satisfy the law.

to them, and if the only way it will become clear to them is for them to ask a series of questions, then I will have to untertain them. Whether I answer them and how I answer them, we will take up when those questions arise. But right now, they are telling me there are different interpretations, and I have got to be clear with them that while they are free to interpret the facts any way they want, they are not free to interpret the law any way they want.

MR. CLIFFORD: I join Mr. Sagarin and Mr. Craig, with one additional objection, your Honor, and it's probably a losing battle on the grounds of jury nullification, I would except to any charge to the fact that the law is to be as given to them by you as the Court. I have argued that and I have lost.

THE COURT: I already told them that in the initial charge, and I am not going to depart from it now.

(Jury entered courtroom at 4:10 p.m.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I have your note which

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reads as follows: "Due to too many different interpretations by the jurors, we feel it necessary to ask for and receive copies of our questions to the Judge and his answers to our questions. We feel this will facilitate our deliberation, specifically Counts Three and Four. Would it be possible for Judge Newman to respond to this either by letter or the marshal, rather than have us go into court for an answer?"

The answer to the last question is no, and the reason that I prefer to have you in court is so that I can discuss & little with you this overall note that you have sent. As to my responses to your questions during the course of your deliberation, while they are being taken down by the court reporter, there is no typed transcript available. If it became necessary to have a particular matter transcribed, I guess that could be done, but right at the moment, that matter just doesn't exist in typewritten form.

The initial charge is written out, and ' might become appropriate for portions of that to be sent to you, although I am not so sure that's a useful idea at this point.

You refer to Counts Three and Four, and you have previously inquired about Counts Three and Four, and I have read to you the elements of Counts Three and Four. What troubles me about this note is when you refer to, as you put it, too many different interpretations -- now, let me be very clear with you about one thing. If you have different interpretations about

the facts, that's an area within your province, the fact finding, as I think I made clear to you at the outset, and I don't want to intrude on that at all.

If you have different interpretations about the law or about what I said about the law, then I do want to be very sure I clarify what the law is so that as you apply the law to the facts that you find, you do so accurately.

So in order to frame any kind of a helpful response to you beyond what I have given, and it may be that the reading of the elements of the counts as I have done to you, with whatever other material I have already conveyed to you, that may be as much discussion of the law as I can usefully give you, but having heard that, if there is a difference of opinion between you as to what the law is, or as to what I meant by a particular phrase or word or discussion of the law, if that's what the interpretations are about, then the only thing I can suggest is if you want to make your inquiry to me a more precise one, it may be I can further interpret the law.

Now, it may be that there is a point beyond which interpretation of the law just can't go and still be meaningful or helpful, and I can't tell what you mean by different interpretations. So I think I have to leave the matter with you. If you are considering the fact finding, then there is no interpretation I can supply on the because you are the sole judges of the facts. But if there is a difference among you as to

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how the law should be interpreted, then you may want to consider

-- you certainly don't have to -- but you may want to consider

whether you want to ask me a more precise question about the law,

and it may be that with such a question, I will be able to

provide you with a further clarification of what the law is. But

I think to try to generally respond would be inappropriate because

I may be covering matters that are just no special concern to

you at all at the moment.

I can appreciate that sometimes listening to legal explanation is not as easy as having a chance to read them, but as I have indicated, some of what I said to you is now typed and some is not. So I think the best way to leave it for the moment is for you to decide as a group what your preference would be.

In general, I am not so sure sending particular sentences or paragraphs of a charge to a jury is necessarily useful. I am afraid that sometimes you then read those without considering the totality of the charge. So that if you have a question, I think it's better if I know exactly what the question is and then can decide what type of response would be most appropriate to you, but let me emphasize, if it's a question of interpreting the law, and if you think a question will clarify or will elicit some clarification from me as to what the law is, you should not hesitate to frame a very pointed question about the law.

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If the differences in interpretation relate to the facts, those are matters entirely for you to decide. So I will excuse you now and just let me know whether you wish to frame a further inquiry or not. I will leave it at that.

(Jury left courtroom at 4:20 p.m.)

THE COURT: I think counsel ought to be available.

MR. CRAIG: Would you like us to formally take exceptions again, or can we rest on our earlier comments?

THE COURT: Well, you can do what you want. I wasn't clearly, frankly, initially how you thought I should respond, and by excepting, I am not exactly sure what you're complaining about, but if you think there is a complaint to be made, you should make it in whatever fashion you wish.

MR. CRAIG: I would like for the record to reiterate my objection at the invitation set forth by the Court to the jury to frame more precise questions with respect to areas that they have already been instructed on, at least four times. I think that's an invitation for comment on facts as applied to the law and the facts, and that's beyond the province of the Court, and I think it's just an invitation for trouble, actually. That's my comment, your Honor.

MR. BOWMAN: Your Honor, I wish to except to what you stated in the complaint -- and the complaint that I have is while you told the jury it's within their province to consider the facts and the Court's province to consider the law, there may be

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a question as to who is to apply the law to the facts. I am not sure it was that clear to the jury and, in any event, I take exception to that portion.

MR. SAGARIN: Your Honor, I join in the other comments. I don't think that note called for any real comment by the Court. I think the Court hit on it. The Court made it as clear as it can four different times what the law is with respect to Counts Three and Four, and to suggest: gee, you didn't do it as well the first time, you may do better the fifth time, I think invites confusion and invites the jury focusing on specific facts which I think the Court didn't want to do. For example, I had made a request that the Court charge the jury with respect to two specific facts, that if they made certain findings on those, then they had to reach a certain result, and the Court chose not to do that initially.

THE COURT: That was a rather different situation. You wanted me to tell them that only if they found one of two facts could they convict on a certain count.

MR. SAGARIN: That's correct. And if they had found that the absence of one of those two facts, there would be a basis for acquittal, and I think the Court has invited that type of inquiry from the jury, and I think there is no need to. The Court already instructed the jury on the law. It's not going to make it any clearer by saying, "I am going to change what that instruction is."

THE COURT: Now, wait a minute. I didn't suggest I was going to change the instruction. I may refine it. I have given them what, after all, are rather abstract propositions of law, and it may be that is where they are having differences of interpretation, and if they are, and I don't know whether they

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MR. SACERIN: It's the same reason. We don't issue special interrogatories in criminal cases.

are not entitled to a refinement of abstract propositions.

THE COURT: That would be if I was asking them for an answer to a specific question. The issue is whether they are going to ask me for the answer to a specific question. I don't know of any rule that prevents a judge from being as helpful as he can to a jury knowing what the law is.

MR. SAGARIN: I think when the Court does that, then it unnecessarily, and I think improperly, prevents the jury from whatit has to do, which is to determine its facts from the entire range of evidence in the case. It would be as if in a bank robbery case, the Court's instruction to the jury is: if you findhe is in the bank, then you should find hir guilty. I think that's an impropagate don't have special interrogatories in the criminal cases, and I think that's what the Court is inviting. It might be — it might be nice to say to the jury, "I would like you to find A, B and C" —

of special interrogatories enters into it. A special interrogatory

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is when you ask the jury to answer a specific question. I didn't ask them to do that. I didn't tell them to do it. I didn't suggest they should do it. I said if they want to ask me a question, they can do it. That's not a special interrogatory.

in effect, the Court is saying, "Find some special questions you can ask me," and it doesn't matter whether they emanate from the jury or from the Court. The Court is causing them to focus on only specific parts of the case, and I think that's improper and not called for in view of the Court's instructions.

THE COURT: Woll, I guess I understand your point.

I really don't see how that is the situation that's happening,
but if you view it that way, you're certainly entitled to.

MR. CLIFFORD: On behalf of the defendant Michael Tiche, I join my cocounsel in their exceptions to the further charge. I also -- the added ground that the jury has a right to nullify the law, and I would except to any charge by you to the jury to the contrary.

MR. NEIGHER: I join Mr. Clifford, your Honor. (Recess taken.)

(In the absence of the jury.)

THE COURT: They have sent me a note which reads as follows: "Count Three, if a defendant only" -- and that word is underlined -- "had the knowledge and intent of the transported explosives prior to it being transported, is he aiding and abetting?"

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I assume you want me to answer that no?

MR. CRAIG: That's correct.

(Jury entered courtroom at 4:55 p.m.)

THE CCURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I have your note which reads, "Count Three, if a defendant only" -- underlined -- "had the knowledge and intent of the transported explosives prior to it being transported, is he aiding and abetting?"

The answer is no.

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(Jury left courtroom at 4:56 p.m.)

(Recess taken.)

(Jury entered courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, your note indicates you would like to go home, and you may.

Again, please bear in mind and pay very careful attention to the instructions I have given you about not discussing the case with anyone during these overnight recesses, nor reading anything about this case. I think still the best thing is just not to look at news; pers during the time you're deliberating as a jury, and that includes any radio or television accounts that — if there should be any, but please don't discuss the case. Just bear in mind the integrity of yourselves as a jury of twelve persons. When you come back tomorrow, well until all twelve are assembled before you actually begin your deliberations. Jury is excused until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Jury excused. Court adjourned at 5:10 p.m.)

